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"For the Snark was a Boojum, you see."**
The constitutional right to compensation for a governmental
taking of property' is relatively easy to apply in situations involving a
straightforward, physical appropriation of land for a public use like a
highway. However, difficulties arise when governmental action
consists only of rules that limit an owner's use of land. In most
situations, these limits are viewed as burdens an individual is
properly subject to as a citizen and land owner.2 From this
** LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARyu AN AGONY IN EIGHT Frrs 83 (1876).
Others have compared the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence to a Snark
hunt. For example, Gideon Kanner uses the analogy in criticizing the Supreme
Court's failure to provide opinions that fulfill the managerial role. Gideon
Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been
Competent in its Effort to Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB.
LAW. 307, 312-320 (1998). Kanner, however, never considers the problems with
devising such opinions. Nor does he address the problem that some Snarks are
Boojums. See infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Pirivate property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation."); see also JAMEs W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF
EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed.
1998) (offering a historical perspective on the Just Compensation Clause in terms
of property rights in the United States). This mandate has been deemed
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applies to state
governments. See Chic., Burlington, & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239
(1897). State constitutions generally contain equivalent protection. For example,
the South Carolina Constitution provides that "private property shall not be
taken . . . for public use without just compensation being first made therefor."
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
2. For example, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987) notes:
Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways of
preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can make of
their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such
restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are
placed on others. These restrictions are "properly treated as part of the
burden of common citizenship." Long ago it was recognized that "all
property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the
owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community," and the
Takings Clause did not transform that principle to one that requires
compensation whenever the State asserts its power to enforce it.
Id. at 481-82 (citations omitted).
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perspective, the exercise of the "police power" of the government,
which has traditionally been used to prohibit public and private
harms, does not usually involve a taking of property, even if the
restriction involved results in a substantial loss in the economic value
of the land.3 For example, zoning restrictions on land generally do not
constitute takings. 4 However, some restrictions on land use are
unwarranted or too extensive and, therefore, constitute a "regulatory
taking." Compensation is required in such cases, because the cost
"should be borne by the public as a whole."5 The problem is thus one
of line-drawing: How does one distinguish mere regulation from a
regulatory taking?
I. TWO PERSPECTIVES ON OPINIONS: SYMBOLIC
AND MANAGERIAL
As with any area of law, the problem of identifying regulatory tak-
ings can be viewed from many perspectives, each of which is true to
some extent.6 This Article contrasts two perspectives on Supreme
Court regulatory takings bpinions.
First, these opinions can be viewed as serving the symbolic func-
tion of simultaneously endorsing two opposing sets of values, the val-
ues furthered by the individual right to use property and the values
served by governmental regulation of the property.7 From this per-
3. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384-97 (1926)
(holding that alleged reductions in value as a result of a zoning ordinance from
$10,000 per acre to $2,500 per acre and from $150 per front foot to $50 per front
foot were not an unconstitutional taking); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,
404-14 (1915) (holding that the prohibition against brickyard operation that
allegedly resulted in a reduction in value from $800,000 to $60,000 was lawful).
As indicated in notes 259-60 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court recently
held that a loss of 94% of value might not be a taking.
4. See, e.g., Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384-97 (holding that the zoning ordinance
did not amount to a taking).
5. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (quoting
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
6. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. Ruv. 1089, 1089 n.2
(1972).
7. See, e.g., James E. Krier, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WAi. & MiRY L. Rv.
1143 (1997) (reviewing the importance and intractable nature of value disagree-
ment underlying the takings doctrine); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88
CoLUm. L. REv. 1600, 1628 (1988) ("[The claims of popular sovereignty and class-
ical property cannot... be stably reconciled at a very high level of abstraction or
generality."); Gregory Daniel Page, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council and
Justice Scalia's Primer on Property Rights: Advancing New Democratic Tradi-
tions by Defending the Tradition of Property, 24 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
Ray. 161 (2000) (contrasting conflicting but coexisting "statist" and "absolutist"
conceptions of property). Cf., e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sover-
eign Immunity "Exception," 110 HA1y. L. REv. 102, 121-22 (1996) (discussing the
Supreme Court's role in a state's sovereign immunity); Glenn H. Reynolds &
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spective, the concern is to recognize the importance of rights and of
regulation and to avoid giving primacy to either. Clear guides for
decisionmaking are avoided because clarity can result in a broad, stra-
tegic endorsement of one set of values as more important than the
other. Though clarity is generally preferred in Supreme Court opin-
ions, it may not be possible or desirable where there is no cultural
agreement on the relative importance of competing values. Thus, a
choice of vague rules over clear per se rules would reflect a pragmatic
acceptance of the lack of cultural agreement on how to resolve the con-
flict between rights and regulation.8 At a deeper level, this symbolic
approach also avoids the need to acknowledge and address the more
general and basic problem of the lack of a generally accepted objective
guide to constitutional interpretation. 9
The second perspective is more concerned with the substance of
opinions and views the United States Supreme Court in terms of its
managerial role at the apex of two parallel hierarchal judicial sys-
tems-the federallo and the state."1 Because the likelihood of Su-
Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the Supreme
Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REV.
369 (2000) (discussing the prohibition of firearms close to schools). For a brief
summary of the conflicting positions on rights vis-A-vis regulation, see F. Patrick
Hubbard, "Takings Reform" and the Process of State Legislative Change in the
Context of a "National Movement," 50 S.C. L. REV. 93, 109-14 (1998).
8. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAw 87-114
(1985) (discussing the importance of giving recognition to conflicting values in the
abortion debate).
9. For a sense of the diversity and complexity of the literature on constitutional
interpretation, see Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, Editor's Fore-
word, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (1997). For further discussion of this point in
terms of use of culture as an objective guide, see infra notes 119-130 and accom-
panying text.
10. The federal courts are divided into two systems. Where state and local govern-
mental action is involved, the matter is litigated in federal district court and ap-
pealed to a federal circuit court. Where federal action is involved, the matter is
litigated in the Court of Federal Claims and appealed to the Federal Circuit
Court. See, e.g., David F. Coursen, The Takings Jurisprudence of the Court of
Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit, 29 ENVTL. L. 821, 822 (1999); Robert
Meltz, Takings Claims Against the Federal Government, in COURSE MATERIALS
ON INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GovERNmENT LIABILITY SE 18 ALI-ABA
475 (1999).
11. The state courts have an especially important role in the area of regulatory tak-
ings because ripeness and abstention doctrines limit the role of the federal courts
in reviewing state land use planning schemes. See, e.g., Williamson County Reg'
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (requiring the denial of
compensation by the state system as a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction of tak-
ings claims); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 409-10
(9th Cir. 1996) (abstaining in a land-use case based on doctrine set forth in RR
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)); Arthur M. Pomponio v. Fauquier
County Bd. of Supervisors, 21 F.3d 1319, 1324-28 (4th Cir. 1994) (abstaining in a
zoning case based on Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 311 U.S. 315 (1943)); Michael M.
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preme Court review of a decision from either system is extremely
small,12 the cases accepted for review must be used to maximum effect
if the Supreme Court is to fulfill its managerial role of providing clear
guidance to the lower courts, to the governmental officials involved in
making the regulations at issue in a takings case, and to the owners of
land subject to regulation.13 In effect, the Supreme Court is like a
corporate CEO who has very limited opportunities to issue memoran-
dums on policy and procedures to guide branch offices all over the na-
tion (and the customers of these branch offices) on how to do a complex
task involving a wide range of circumstances.
This managerial analogy cannot be pushed too far. The Supreme
Court is a multimember common law court, reacting to petitions for
certiorari and assisted only by a small staff of novice law clerks.
There are limits on the ability of such an institution to provide de-
tailed management guidelines. 14 Nevertheless, many people argue
that the concept of the "rule of law" necessitates that Supreme Court
opinions play a substantively meaningful role in determining the pre-
cise results that are reached by the lower courts. Otherwise, lower
court decisions will not be based on objective standards. As a result,
the "rule of law" will be frustrated by the uncertainty, contradiction,
and instability that will occur.15 Moreover, the court occasionally
Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory Takings, 3
WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'y 99 (2000); Max Kidalov & Richard H. Seamon, The Miss-
ing Pieces of the Debate over Federal Property Rights Legislation, 27 HASTINGS
CoNsT. L.Q. 1, 5-17 (1999) (ripeness).
12. In the October 2000 Term, for example, the Court granted review and acted upon
about 1.75% of the cases that were on its docket (total of 7760 paid and informa
pauperis cases; total of 136 cases available for review). See Statistical Recap of
Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three Terms, 70 U.S.L.W. 3060 (2001);
see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 536 (1992) ("Last Term alone we
received over 5,000 petitions for certiorari, but we have the capacity to decide
only a small fraction of these cases on the merits.").
13. Opinions also serve other managerial roles. For example, they can correct error
in the case involved.
14. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TuIE: JUDICIAL MINIAIALISM ON THE
SuPREME COURT 3-5 (1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court should say "no more
than necessary to [decide] an outcome, .... leaving as much as possible undecided
... when the Court is dealing with a constitutional issue of high complexity about
which many people feel deeply and on which the nation is divided (on moral or
other grounds)" (emphasis added)).
15. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating from
the "Rule of Law," 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345 (1998) (looking at four New York
Court of Appeals cases and whether they are "consistent with the United States
Supreme Court precedent and the rule of law"); Kanner, supra note **, at 349
(discussing that the "field of regulatory inverse condemnation does not have a
reliable underlying doctrine to guide" planners, lawyers, and judges). Cf., e.g.,
LON L. FuLLER, THE MoRALrry OF LAw 38-39, 63-70 (rev. ed. 1969) (arguing that a
decision-making process that is ad hoc, unclear, or contradictory is contrary to
the achievement of a "moral" legal system); Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong with
the Supreme Court?, 51 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 685-86 (1990) (criticizing the Su-
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
adopts a clearly managerial perspective-for example, the adoption of
a clear, easily applied rule to guide police in Miranda v. Arizona.i
6
Though Supreme Court opinions are not exclusively "symbolic" or
"managerial," it is possible to categorize an opinion based on the de-
gree to which it clearly prescribes the result in subsequent cases. An
opinion can be viewed as symbolic to the extent that it endorses con-
flicting value schemes and avoids clear, per se rules that would clearly
result in the "victory" of one of the competing schemes. In contrast, a
managerial opinion clearly indicates value preferences and explicitly
guides decision-making. Such explicitness is particularly important to
the managerial role of the Supreme Court in an area like regulatory
takings because there is no cultural consensus about the relative im-
portance of the competing values. Given this lack of consensus, vague
rules will provide little substantive guidance on the "right result" to
lower courts.
Opinions that fulfill the symbolic function should not necessarily
be regarded as unimportant or as bad judicial craftsmanship. Sym-
bols, rhetoric, and narratives about power are important.' 7 Contro-
versies over burning the American flag or flying the confederate battle
flag demonstrate the emotional depths involved with symbols. Views
about property rights and about owners' legal responsibilities to the
community also involve deeply held, emotion-stirring beliefs.18 Con-
sequently, a symbolic opinion is important to these beliefs, even if it
simply affirms both values or uses language that appears to prefer one
value over the other but avoids adopting a clear substantive standard
preme Court for overuse of vague multipart tests, which result in poor quality of
fulfilling the function of providing "reasonabl [e], intelligible and stable guidelines
to other actors in the legal system"); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as the Law
of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (discussing the use of broad applicable
principles in the creation of new law). For the concept that a process can fulfill
the rule of law, see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000)
(providing that because the case-by-case-totality-of-circumstances test of volunta-
riness of confessions is not sufficient in the context of the coercive nature of mod-
em custodial interrogation, Miranda "laid down 'concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.'" (quoting Miranda,
384 U.S. at 442)). Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), contains similar
language concerning the importance of clear rules in the context of the Fourth
Amendment.
17. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR. & NANCY LEVIT, JURISPRUDENCE: CONTEMPO-
RARY READINGS, PROBLEMS AND NARRATIVES 297-324 (1994) (discussing the impor-
tance of narratives and "storytelling"); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND
SOLIDARITY 29 (1989) (emphasizing the role of narrative in view of "one's life, or
the life of one's community"); NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAw: THE ESSAYS OF
ROBERT COVER 271 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992); Robert Cover, Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1752 (1988); William W. Fisher III, The Significance of Public Perceptions of
the Takings Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1774 (1988).
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that would, in fact, adopt such preference. Moreover, where it is not
possible to craft a clear definite rule, a vague symbolic standard may
be the best that can be expected of judges.1 9 In such cases, a vague,
imprecise "rule" which provides a structure for addressing specific cir-
cumstances in the context of a fair process will be a better way to ad-
dress a problem than a clear formal substantive rule that does not
respect factual distinctions that are important to differing value
schemes. 20
II. PENN CENTRAL AND THE AD HOC BALANCING
APPROACH: PRAGMATIC TRIUMPH OF SYMBOL
By the 1970s, the Supreme Court had openly abandoned the search
for an explicit test or standard of when a regulatory taking occurs.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City2l summarized the
lack of a substantive test for identifying a taking as follows:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty. While this Court
has recognized that the 'Fifth Amendment's guarantee... [is] designed to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole," this Court,
quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining
when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportion-
ately concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that
whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's
failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely "upon
the particular circumstances [in that] case."
2 2
In lieu of a test, Penn Central identifies several factors that are to be
considered in an ad hoc balancing approach:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's decisions
have identified several factors that have particular significance. The eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when the inter-
ference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by govern-
ment than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
2 3
19. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 15, at 1186-87 (noting that despite the value of clear
general rules, there are times where they are not possible; therefore, "[wie will
have totality of the circumstances tests and balancing modes of analysis with us
forever").
20. See Wibren Van der Burg, The Expressive and Communicative Functions of Law,
Especially with Regard to Moral Issues, 20 LAw & PHIL. 31, 53-54 (2001). For
further discussion of this point, see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
21. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
22. Id. at 123-24 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
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Because of its adoption of an ad hoc balancing test rather than an
explicit standard, Penn Central can be categorized as an opinion that
adopts a symbolic perspective. More specifically, it explicitly recog-
nizes the importance of both property rights and regulation while also
refusing to adopt an explicit standard that would resolve the conflict
in favor of one set of values at the expense of the other. Instead, the
court simply identifies vague factors to be used in an ad hoc inquiry
into "justice and fairness."
A. Reasons for Approach: Complexity and Lack of
Independent Definition of Property
The recognition of the lack of a "set formula" and the adoption of
the ad hoc balancing approach do not necessarily reflect a deliberate
choice to prefer symbolism over management. Nor has the lack of a
test resulted from a lack of effort24 or intelligence25 on the part of
judges and scholars. Instead, the adoption of the Penn Central balanc-
ing test should be viewed as a pragmatic acceptance of the problems
resulting from the complexity and diversity of the circumstances in-
volving regulation and from the lack of an objective test or definition
of property rights that is independent from the positive law.
The complexity of land use regulation is clear from a review of the
types of issues that the Supreme Court has addressed in deciding
whether a regulatory taking has occurred. 26 These claims involve not
24. "Thousands of square miles of our nation have been deforested to provide the
paper to print the thousands-probably hundreds of thousands-of books, arti-
cles, notes, comments, seminar papers, newsletters, etc., dealing with regulatory
takings." Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Florida's Private Property Rights Pro-
tection Act: Does It Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 FLA. L. REv. 695,
696 (1966); see also CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 49 (1994) ("Schol-
ars have joined judges in spilling a great deal of ink over takings ... ."). The scale
of the scholarly effort is reflected by the following: A WestLaw Keycite search in
February 2001 for Lucas v. South Caroling Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992), indicates 2,397 citations, of which 658 were cases and 1,730 were secon-
dary sources, mostly articles. For Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, there were 3,140 citations, of which 1,216 were cases and 1,836 were secon-
dary sources.
25. "The judges and scholars who have addressed the issue in the twentieth century
are as intelligent a group as is likely to address it in the twenty-first. The tak-
ings issue is muddy because it is inherently hard to deal with, not because the
people who have addressed it haven't been smart enough to see the light." WIL-
LIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAw, EcoNoMICs, AND POLITIcS 325
(1995).
26. For a discussion of a random sample of regulatory takings cases that indicates
the diversity of issues involved, see infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
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only zoning27 and environmental schemes, 28 but also concerns rang-
ing from rent control and other restrictions on landlords 29 to prohibi-
tions on business activities. 30 Moreover, within each category, there
may be important doctrinal differences in addressing the different
ways that regulations can affect land.33 Despite such complexity, it
might be possible to develop a set of clear rules if there were an agreed
upon standard of property rights that could be used to determine
when a land use by an owner is improperly limited by regulation.
One possible standard is state law because property rights are gen-
erally defined by the positive law of each state. However, although
rights under state law may appear to be relatively objective and easily
determined, this is not the case. These property rights have always
been subject to limits because one owner's use of property may affect
another. Thus, an owner's rights under state law are (and always
have been) subject to a governmental exercise of the police power to
determine whether any particular use of the property must be limited
to prevent "harm" to the public good or to another person. Moreover,
these limits have never been static because, in order to perform this
preventive function, the state must be able to address changes in cir-
cumstances by imposing new limits or by using existing limits in new
ways. These changes can have a negative impact on the value of the
property subject to the new limit. In theory, the government could be
required to compensate for this impact. However, the government
could not use the police power effectively if it were required to com-
pensate owners every time the value of their property is reduced in
27. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (uphold-
ing the application of a historic preservation ordinance); Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (striking down the application of a zoning ordinance);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a zoning
scheme).
28. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (finding a possible
taking).
29. See, e.g., Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (holding that a rent control
ordinance for mobile home parks was not a taking); Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1 (1988) (holding that a taking claim was premature, but noting that
rent control was not necessarily a taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that the requirement that landlords
allow installation of cable by a cable television company was a taking).
30. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding the prohibition of
manufacture or sale of alcohol).
31. For example, the Supreme Court has held that use restrictions in a zoning
scheme are treated differently from "exactments." See Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994); see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) ("[Wle have not extended the rough-proportionality
test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions-land-use decisions condi-
tioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public use.").
Exactments are discussed further in notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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value. 32 Therefore, compensation is not required in most cases of a
change in state law. In short, property rights under state law are
vague, and it is permissible to impose new limits without
compensation.
There is a risk that the government's ability to exercise the police
power without having to compensate will result in property rights be-
coming simply a matter of "positive law"-i.e., rights will be simply
what the legislature or courts say they are.3 3 Such a result is contrary
to the notion that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is designed
to limit the government and thus protect property owners from gov-
ernment abuse of the owners' "rights." Given the Takings Clause, "the
government does not have unlimited power to redefine property
rights."34 Thus, an independent, objective test for identifying rights is
needed so that property rights can serve as a limit on governmental
use of the police power to enact positive law. Unfortunately, there is
no such objective standard.35 More specifically, there is no agreement
on a standard or theory of property rights that is sufficiently precise to
serve as a test for identifying limits on government power.
The standards that have been agreed upon are so vague that they
do not provide a test for distinguishing a regulatory taking from other
regulatory action under the police power. For example, it is possible
to get widespread agreement on the principle that liberty can be re-
stricted in order to prevent harm to others.36 The common law relied
on this shared view about limiting harm in adopting the "rule" that
the right to use land is subject to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum
non lmedas ("[Olne should use his own property in such a manner as
not to injure that of another."3 7). In the takings context, the Supreme
Court has noted:
Long ago it was recognized that "all property in this country is held under the
implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the corn-
32. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("Government hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized,
some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power.").
33. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("There is an inherent
tendency towards circularity ... for if the owner's reasonable expectations are
shaped by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority,
property tends to become what courts say it is.").
34. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 439 (1982).
35. For a critique of recent "objective" formulations by the Supreme Court, see infra
notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
36. This agreement underlies the continued appeal of John Stewart Mills' classic es-
say, ON LBERTY.
37. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
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munity," and the Takings Clause did not transform that principle to one that
requires compensation whenever the State asserts its power to enforce it.38
Despite the long tradition of using such maxims concerning harm
to others, they have been widely recognized as vague and question-
begging because they do not provide guidance until one first answers
the question: What is an injury?3 9 For example, if Ramona Rocker
likes to listen to loud music in her yard, and Gerald Green loves to
listen to the birds in his yard, the sic utere maxim is useless until one
first determines whether Rocker "injures" Green by playing music
that is so loud Green cannot "enjoy" the singing of the birds.40 Unless
there is an objective way to answer such questions, sic utere cannot
help us determine whether an owner has a "right" to a use that may be
taken by a regulatory limit on that use.
The problem of identifying rights is further complicated in the reg-
ulatory takings context by the "denominator problem," which arises
whenever one wants to determine the extent of the impact of a regula-
tion on the owner's rights. For example, if a parcel is rezoned from
commercial to residential, has the owner suffered a "total" loss of his
right to use the land for commercial use or a "partial" loss of one
among many possible uses of the land?4 1 In terms of fractional analy-
sis, the numerator in this example is the loss of commercial use, and
the issue is whether the denominator is commercial use alone or all
possible uses.
Three types of denominator problems arise. The first parallels the
rezoning question above and involves the question of whether a partic-
ular use is a distinct legal interest that, because of this distinct status,
must serve as the denominator by itself. Where this is an issue, the
problem of circularity in terms of the positive law arises again. If posi-
tive law is used to determine whether an interest is distinct (and thus
38. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987)
(citations omitted); see also Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667-68
(1878) (stating that the restraint of nuisances through the exercise of the police
power "rests upon the fundamental principle that every one shall so use his own
[property] as not to wrong and injure another.... TEvery right, from absolute
ownership in property down to a mere easement, is purchased and holden subject
to the restriction that it shall be so exercised as not to injure others." (quoting
Coates v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow. 585, 605 (N.Y. 1827))).
39. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 48-50
(1964) (criticizing "noxious use" analysis on the ground that it is question-
begging).
40. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Taking Persons Seriously: A Jurisprudential Per-
spective on Social Disputes in a Changing Neighborhood, 48 U. CiN. L. REv. 15,
19-21 (1979) (using a similar hypothetical in the context of discussing the diffi-
culty of awarding entitlements to land use).
41. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1065-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (phrasing the de-
nominator issue in terms of rezoning from multifamily residential to single-fam-
ily residential). Such rezoning is not treated as a total loss. See infra note 151
and accompanying text.
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is the denominator), there will be no independent source of rights to
serve as a limit on governmental regulation. 42 The second type of de-
nominator problem arises from the ability to subdivide land. If a wet-
lands regulation prohibits the filling of a bog that constitutes one acre
of a five acre parcel, is the denominator one acre (the bog) or five acres
(the total parcel)?4 3 The third type of denominator is temporal. If a
restriction is in effect for only a specific length of time-e.g., one
year-is the denominator that year or some longer period-e.g., a
"useful life of the investment"?44 The Supreme Court summarized its
inability to develop a test to resolve denominator problems as follows:
42. Because a state's positive law of property interests can be viewed as "distinct"
from its positive law of regulatory limits, it is tempting to think that a state's law
concerning "property interests" can provide an independent basis for identifying
distinct property interests that will serve as the denominator. Thus, for example,
rezoning from commercial to residential is generally treated as an "easy" example
of the denominator problem because the positive law of the states does not treat
the right to commercial use as a distinct interest. See infra note 151 and accom-
panying text. However, what if a state legislature, court, or agency disagrees
with a federal court's characterization of the interest defined by state law? See,
e.g., Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 719 A.2d 19, 29 n.24 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998) (suggesting that the Supreme Court may have been mistaken
in Keystone about the law of Pennsylvania). Can the Supreme Court "reverse" a
state supreme court if it disagrees with the state supreme court's interpretation
of the state's law? See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998)
("[A] State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing traditional prop-
erty interests long recognized under state law."); Stevens v. City of Cannon
Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari) ("Our opinion in Lucas... would be a nullity if anything that a state court
chooses to denominate 'background law-regardless of whether it is really
such-could eliminate property rights."); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18 ("We
stress that an affirmative decree eliminating all economically beneficial uses may
be defended only if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents
would exclude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is
presently found." (emphasis added)); McDonald, Sommer, & Frates v. Yolo
County, 477 U.S. 340, 352 n.8 (1986) (noting that the Supreme Court "must re-
spect" the decision of a state court "on matters of local law" but not indicating
whether the Supreme Court could respectfully disagree with a state court); Wil-
liam W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1407 (1993)
("We can ... expect to see the Supreme Court reexamining and sometimes over-
turning state courts' interpretations of their own states' common law."). Even if
there is agreement between the state and the United States Supreme Court as to
the prior law, can a state change its positive law about property interests? There
is no "objective" standard to answer these questions. Thus, the positive law of
each state provides only limited guidance. For further discussion of this point,
see infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (recognizing the uncertainty about treat-
ment of regulation requiring "a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natu-
ral state"); John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory
Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994) (analyzing the "denominator"
problem).
44. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 153-64 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 80:465
20011 PALAZZOLO, LUCAS, AND PENN CENTRAL 477
"Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the composition of the de-
nominator in our 'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent pro-
nouncements by the Court."45
B. Effects of Approach: Delegation and Uncertainty
Penn Central concluded there was no independent test for identify-
ing a taking and adopted an ad hoc balancing approach for identifying
regulatory takings. Given the problems of devising a standard, this
balancing scheme may be the best approach available. Nevertheless,
it is important to note that the use of such an ad hoc balancing test
has two important effects.
First, it results in a considerable delegation of substantive power
to the lower courts. Only proper weighting can result in correct sub-
stantive decisions in a balancing scheme. Therefore, given the small
number of cases that can be reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Penn
Central approach will provide substantively "correct" answers only if
the lower courts give the "proper" weight to each of these vague fac-
tors. As a result, this approach necessitates a reliance on the capabil-
ity of the lower courts to make the value judgments necessary to
determine the proper weight to assign to the competing factors. More-
over, because of the restrictions on bringing takings claims concerning
state programs in the federal courts, 46 the ad hoc balancing test will
generally be applied by state courts in such cases. As a result, state
courts will be determining the content of the constitutional right
under the takings clause because they will be responsible for assess-
ing the relative values of property rights vis-h-vis regulation in the
circumstances at issue in a particular case involving the state's regu-
latory program.
The evaluation of this impact depends partly upon one's views
about the functions of the Supreme Court. If the view is that the
Court should fulfill its managerial function by providing a scheme to
produce "right answers" concerning a fundamental constitutional
right, the delegation to such disparate lower courts can be criticized on
the ground that it offends the rule of law47 because of the risks of
arbitrariness and a high rate of errors. However, if the function of
opinions in this area is seen as affirming competing values and provid-
ing legitimacy for government regulation by utilizing a process for
resolving the conflict that satisfies the rule of law because the liti-
gants will accept it as "fair," then the delegation can be praised as an
efficient use of scarce judicial resources. 48
45. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17 n.7.
46. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
47. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 7, at 1629 ("[B]alancing-or, better, the judicial
practice of situated judgment or practical reason-is not law's antithesis but a
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The second effect of using the balancing approach is that owners
and regulators will have considerable uncertainty about regulatory
takings. This uncertainty is inevitable if the various lower courts do
not agree on the relative weights of the competing values to be bal-
anced. Moreover, even if the various lower courts were likely to reach
the same result in applying the balancing test to a particular set of
facts, the regulators and owners would have problems in predicting
this result beforehand. The effects of this uncertainty can be severe
because litigation in this area is both expensive and lengthy.49 As
with the effect of delegation, one's evaluation of uncertainty depends,
in part, upon whether one is viewing the function of opinions in terms
of management or symbol.
Not surprisingly, persons with strong views about the relative im-
portance of the two competing value schemes may prefer a managerial
scheme, but only so long as it favors their preferred scheme. For ex-
ample, the defenders of a strong view of property rights have been
particularly critical of the results of using the Penn Central test. One
reason for this criticism is their view that courts utilizing the balanc-
ing test do not give property rights enough value in comparison to reg-
ulation.5 O Another reason for this criticism is that delegation and
uncertainty can have a greater negative impact on owners than on
regulators because it is often easier and cheaper for regulators to
adopt new rules than it is for owners to fight them. Even if a lower
court does determine that a taking has occurred, the government can
reduce its losses by withdrawing the regulation and thus be liable, at
most, for only a temporary taking. Moreover, ripeness rules can give
regulators at least one "free shot" at the owner, who may be required
to revise his plans several times before a court will consider a taking
claim.51 Finally, given these problems and given the costs and uncer-
tainty of litigation, an owner may simply decide that it is not worth
the fight. This decision not to fight is particularly likely where the
stakes are relatively small or where time is important to profitability.
part of law's essence."). Cf., e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969) (arguing that discretion that is confined, struc-
tured, and checked is the best approach to decision-making where rigid rules are
inappropriate); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 91-96, 120-32 (1961) (arguing
that law is inherently open textured and that one type of law consists of rules
empowering people to make decisions-for example, "rules of adjudication");
JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74-76 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the impor-
tance of procedural justice where there is no independent standard of substantive
justice or no way to determine the answer based on an accepted independent
standard).
49. See Hubbard, supra note 7, at 107-08.
50. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAxINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); MARK L. POLLOT, GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY:
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AMERICA (1993).
51. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Because of these reasons, a test that is "correct" in the sense that it
protects rights adequately and is sufficiently precise to enable the
lower courts and regulators to identify regulatory takings correctly is
viewed as extremely important to those who view the right to compen-
sation for takings as essential to liberty and to efficiency. 52 In addi-
tion to a test that will draw the line correctly, defenders of a strong
version of property rights also want the line to be defined with suffi-
cient precision that it can be identified in a predictable manner that is
both administratively simple and subject to minimal opportunities for
administrative abuse. These concerns for clarity, predictability, and
administrative efficiency and fairness have been major reasons, along
with the concern for "correct" answers, given in support of the national
"property rights" movement for influencing judicial decisions 53 and for
adopting takings statutes that have clear, easily applied rules favor-
ing the right to compensation.54
HI. LUCAS AND THE CATEGORICAL TOTAL TAKING
TEST: SYMBOL IN THE GUISE OF
MANAGERIAL CATEGORIES
Though flexible enough to address the complexity of regulation and
the lack of consensus on values, the ad hoc balancing approach has
serious shortcomings as a managerial technique, particularly if one is
concerned with providing a predictable scheme for getting the "right
answer" in order to protect property rights from "excessive" regula-
tion. Consequently, it is not surprising that, in other contexts, the Su-
preme Court has rejected the approach of using ad hoc balancing and
has opted instead for categorical approaches to protect rights.55 In
52. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("[The dichot-
omy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property does
not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlaw-
ful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a
'personal' right .... [A] fundamental interdependence exists between the per-
sonal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have
meaning without the other. That rights in property are basic civil rights has long
been recognized."); Hubbard, supra note 7, at 110-13 (1998) (discussing the liber-
tarian perspective on land rights).
53. See, e.g., POLLOT, supra note 50, at 161-82 (setting forth litigation strategy);
Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis
and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. EuvTL. AFF. L. REV. 509 (1998).
54. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 7, at 109-12 (discussing arguments for property
rights reform).
55. For discussion of the need for a categorical test in assessing the voluntariness of
confessions, see supra note 16 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has
also emphasized the problems with the ad hoc approach in applying the First
Amendment to common law defamation rules:
[The balance between the needs of the press and the individual's claim
to compensation for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case
basis .... "[lit might seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most
479
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1992, the Court attempted to provide more clarity and predictability
in the takings area by identifying two limited per se categories of reg-
ulatory taking in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.56 This ap-
proach could be useful from a managerial perspective because even
limited categorical tests can help manage and control the lower courts
in at least some cases.
However, this managerial effect will not happen unless the catego-
ries are clearly defined. If they are not, then Lucas is more properly
viewed as a symbolic opinion. The following sections argue that, be-
cause of the difficulty of identifying regulatory takings and the limits
on the ability of the Supreme Court to articulate clear per se tests in
this area, Lucas is factually narrow and conceptually vague. Conse-
quently, the case does not clearly guide and limit lower courts. In-
stead, Lucas performs the symbolic function of strongly endorsing the
value of property rights and criticizing regulatory excess 5 7 while also
allowing regulation to restrict the use of property in a wide range of
circumstances.
A. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Lucas notes that, in dealing with a challenge that a regulation re-
sults in a taking, the Supreme Court has generally eschewed any "'set
formula' for determining how far is too far" and has, instead, preferred
utilitarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every jury verdict in
every libel case, in order to ascertain whether the final judgment leaves
fully protected whatever First Amendment values transcend the legiti-
mate state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who prevailed."
But this approach would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain ex-
pectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower courts
unmanageable. Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests
at stake in each particular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad
rules of general application.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1979) (quoting Rosenblum v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 63 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). For an argu-
ment that there are important reasons for differences in approach between
speech and takings, see Page, supra note 7, at 199-204.
56. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Only five judges joined the majority opinion. Justice Ken-
nedy concurred in the result, but disagreed as to the standard to be applied. See
infra notes 109-12. Justice Souter was of the view that the writ of certiorari in
Lucas should not have been granted. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1076-78 (statement
of Souter, J.). Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented on the merits. See id. at
1036-61 (Blackmun J., dissenting), 1061-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 42, at 1408-09 (noting the pattern of attacks by Scalia
on regulators in Lucas and other opinions); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Cor-
rect "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1411, 1419-20 (1993) (arguing that the
majority in Lucas felt that regulatory actions were resulting in "horrible" action
and that therefore a "win" for a landowner was needed); infra notes 269-72 and
accompanying text.
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to "engag[e] in... essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."58 However,
Lucas also asserts that, where real property is involved,5 9 the Su-
preme Court has held:
[There are] at least two discrete categories of regulatory action [that are]
compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in
support of the restraint. The first encompasses regulations that compel the
property owner to suffer a physical "invasion" of his property. In general (at
least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intru-
sion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have re-
quired compensation....
The second situation in which we have found categorical treatment appro-
priate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land.
6 0
The dispute in Lucas involved two lots on a coastal barrier island
that could not be developed because of a statutory scheme designed to
protect the shore by prohibiting new construction between the beach
and an administratively determined erosion "baseline."61 Lucas had
purchased the lots before the enactment of the regulatory scheme, and
the trial court held that the lots, which were largely located between
the shoreline and the erosion baseline, had become "valueless" be-
cause of the development prohibition.6 2 Given this total effect on the
value of the land, the Supreme Court held that a taking existed under
the second category of per se takings. The case was remanded to the
South Carolina Supreme Court for a determination of whether preex-
isting background principles of nuisance and property law prohibited
the construction of the house.63 On remand, the South Carolina Su-
58. 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978)).
59. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28 (indicating greater protection for land vis-a-vis
personal property, which can constitutionally suffer a total loss in value without
compensation). For analyses of reasons for treating land differently, see, for ex-
ample, Paul J. Boudreaux, The Quintessential Best Case for "Takings" Compensa-
tion-A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying the Elements of Land-Use Regulations
That Present the Best Case for Government Compensation, 34 SAN DiEGo L. Ruv.
193, 214-23 (1997) (supporting difference); Jeffrey A.- Frieden, Towards a Politi-
cal Economy of Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 137 (2000) (questioning reasons
for difference).
60. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. Lucas involved the second situation. As an example of
the first type of per se taking, Lucas refers to Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). The Lucas opinion asserts that Loretto holds
the following: "New York's law requiring landlords to allow television cable com-
panies to emplace cable facilities in their apartment buildings constituted a tak-
ing, . . . even though the facilities occupied at most only 1.5 cubic feet of the
landlords' property ...." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000); Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1006-09.
62. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
63. See id. at 1031-32; infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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preme Court held that no common law prohibition applied to the pro-
posed house and that a taking had occurred.6 4
B. Vagueness of the Test
Regardless of one's views as to whether a regulatory taking occurs
in a fact situation like Lucas, neither of the per se categories identified
by the majority opinion in Lucas provides a "set formula" for even a
limited class of regulatory takings. Though this Article focuses on the
problems with the total takings test, it should be noted that the first
category-physical invasions-also fails to provide a formula because
many physical invasions are not viewed as takings. 65 For example,
"exactments" as a condition of development include a wide range of
constitutionally permissible dedications of land.66 Dolan v. City of
Tigard67 recognizes that, as a condition for permission to expand a
retail store, a city may "exact" a dedication of land from a land owner
so long as the city makes "some sort of individualized determination
that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the
impact of the proposed development."68 Moreover, the physical inva-
sion test is limited to the permanent "physical occupation of a portion
of... [the property] by a third party."6 9 Thus, this categorical limit on
regulation has very little impact in terms of protecting private prop-
erty rights because the limit does not address a wide range of rules
that, for example: (1) permit nonpermanent invasions, 70 (2) effec-
tively require an owner to dedicate land and resources to a public good
(for example, building setbacks and landscaping requirements for
parking lots),71 or (3) require a landlord to install things like utility
64. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992). The taking was viewed
as a temporary, rather than permanent, taking because a variance scheme had
been adopted during the litigation and this scheme could allow Lucas to build.
See id. at 486; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010-14. Following the decision by the South
Carolina Supreme Court, the state purchased the lots from Lucas and then sold
them. See infra note 205. For a discussion of subsequent litigation concerning
the lots, see infra note 205 and accompanying text.
65. See FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 320.
66. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§ 9.11-9.23 (4th ed., Lexis Law
Publ'g 1997) (describing on- and off-site improvements, impact fees, and other
considerations that municipalities may "exact" from builders).
67. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
68. Id. at 391.
69. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982).
70. See id. at 435 n.12 ("The permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occu-
pation distinguish it from temporary limitations on the right to exclude. Not
every physical invasion is a taking."), 441 ("We affirm the traditional rule that a
permanent physical occupation of property is a taking." (emphasis added)). Cf
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (holding that a shop-
ping center must accommodate a person exercising the right of free speech).
71. See, e.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) (upholding setback requirements
challenged as a denial of due process and equal protection); Ehrlich v. City of
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connections for tenants at his expense.72 Thus, the physical invasion
categorical limit is largely symbolic because it endorses private prop-
erty rights without substantially limiting physical invasions.
1. Recognition of Problems in Lucas
The opinions in Lucas recognize that applying the categorical "to-
tal taking" test will require case-by-case adjudication and that there
will be problems of vagueness in this application. One source of
vagueness is the denominator problem discussed above. 73 The major-
ity opinion concedes that the issue of whether a taking is "total" in-
volves denominator problems and that the Court has not identified a
test for addressing these problems.7 4 The majority explicitly notes
that, given this lack of a test, "the rhetorical force of our 'deprivation
of all economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision."75 In
addition, it was clear to the Court that, even if the denominator
problems were resolved, there are problems with determining whether
an owner had lost "all economically beneficial or productive use of
land." Indeed, several justices question whether Lucas' land in fact
Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 450 (Cal. 1996) (landscaping); Parking Ass'n of Ga.,
Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 203 n.3 (Ga. 1994) (landscaping); Daley v.
Blaine County, 701 P.2d 234, 237-38 (Idaho 1985) (holding no taking occurred).
Cf Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (distinguishing physical oc-
cupation resulting from "legislative" actions vis-a-vis "adjucative" actions). Jus-
tices Thomas and O'Connor dissented from the denial of certiorari in Parking
Ass'n of Georgia noting that "[tihe lower courts should not have to struggle to
make sense of this tension in our case law." Parking Ass'n of Ga., 515 U.S. at
1118 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
72. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440. Ironically, the opinion in Loretto notes that, al-
though the state was required to compensate landlords for the physical invasion
resulting from a regulation requiring the installation of coaxial cable by the cable
company in apartment buildings, it would be a "different question" if the landlord
were required to install the cable for his tenants at his own expense. Id. at 440
n.19. The symbolic nature of Loretto is also reflected in the amount of compensa-
tion to be received by the landlords. See id. at 437 n.15 (noting that state com-
mission had established a presumptive award of $1); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 446 N.E.2d 428, 434 (N.Y. 1983) ("[The] amount receiva-
ble by any single property owner is small . . . ."); see also Loretto v. Group W.
Cable, 522 N.Y.S.2d 543 (App. Div. 1987) (denying Loretto's claim for attorney
fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 on the grounds that Loretto had not ap-
plied for compensation and, therefore, had not been denied the constitutional
right to compensation). But see Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437 n.15 (noting that argu-
ments concerning value were "speculative").
73. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
74. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun recognized
that there is no "objective" way to determine what the denominator should be. Id.
at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens criticized the lack of a defini-
tion for the property interest that will serve as the denominator. Id. at 1065-66
(Stevens, J., dissenting). For discussion of this problem in terms of the facts of
Lucas, see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
75. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
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lost all economic value.76 Finally, a total loss of the economic value of
the owner's land is not a taking under Lucas if the proscribed uses
were never "a part of [the owner's] title to begin with."77 Because of
this limit, the "total loss" category of per se taking cannot be applied
until after one has determined the uses that were permitted prior to
the denial of development under the challenged regulation. As indi-
cated below,78 the courts have adopted several different approaches to
make this determination. This diversity in approach was inevitable
because Lucas does not provide a clear standard for making the
determination.
2. Treatment of Problems in Lucas
a. Summary
The majority was able to sidestep these problems in Lucas by a
superficial treatment of the facts and by a remand to the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court. The problem of identification of the property in-
terest involved was avoided by simply accepting the label used in
Lucas' pleadings-the "fee simple interest"-rather than, for example,
the right to build a house or a bulkhead-and adopting the view that a
taking occurs if, as a result of the regulation, the fee simple interest is
"left... without economic value."7 9 Denominator problems were also
avoided by ignoring the history of the development of Isle of Palms.
Lucas was a "contractor, manager and part owner of the Wild Dune
development on the Isle of Palms."80 "In the late 1970s, Lucas and
others began extensive residential development of the Isle of Palms"8 1
and "It]oward the close of the development cycle for one residential
subdivision known as 'Beachwood East,' Lucas in 1986 purchased the
two lots at issue in this litigation for his own account."8 2 These two
76. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
77. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
78. See infra notes 172-93 and accompanying text. For additional critiques of this
aspect of Lucas, see Fisher, supra note 42, at 1407 (arguing that nuisance law is
too vague to clarify takings doctrine); William Funk, Revolution or Restatement?
Awaiting Answers to Lucas' Unanswered Questions, 23 ENVrL. L. 891, 898 (1993)
(arguing that reliance on state nuisance doctrines may lead to divergent applica-
tions of the takings doctrine in different states); John A. Humbach, Evolving
Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 CoLum. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 13
(1993) (arguing that adoption of a common law nuisance standard provides few
"objective parameters" for legislative conduct); John A. Humbach, "Taking" the
Imperial Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting Property Interests and Judicial Revi-
sion of Legislative Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771, 815-16 (1993) (arguing
that adoption of a nuisance standard usurps the proper legislative role of deter-
mining regulatory legitimacy).
79. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
80. Id. at 1038 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1008.
82. Id.
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lots were "two of the last four pieces of vacant property in the develop-
ment."8 3 Given Lucas' role in the total development, it is not clear
why the Court simply accepted the two lots as the denominator rather
than a larger tract. If a larger tract had been chosen, there may not
have been a total taking.
The majority avoided the problem of determining whether all the
value of the two lots was eliminated by accepting the trial court's
questionable finding of fact that the land had been rendered value-
less.84 Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion notes that he accepts
this finding, though he finds it "curious" and that he had "reserva-
tions" about accepting it.85 Justice Blackmun's dissent notes that this
finding is "implausible78 6 and "almost certainly erroneous."8 7 Justice
Souter notes that the finding is "highly questionable."8 8 As with the
unexplored development history, it seems likely that most defendants
in a case involving a total taking claim will offer evidence of some
value remaining in the land at issue regardless of how restrictive the
regulation at issue.8 9
83. Id. at 1038 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. See id. at 1020 n.9. This approach to findings is not unprecedented in addressing
the conflict between property rights and land use regulations. For example,
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), relied on a master's express
finding that inclusion of a parcel of property in one zoning district rather than
another did not promote the health, safety, convenience, or welfare of the city
and, therefore, struck down the inclusion as a denial of due process. This ap-
proach enabled the court to endorse property rights by the use of a "categorical"
test applicable to cases where no public interest was served without substantially
undermining the endorsement of zoning two years earlier in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
85. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that Lucas still had the right to
exclude and that he could "picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in
a movable trailer"). It should be noted that the record in Lucas did not indicate
whether Lucas could use a tent or trailer. For a discussion of the lack of evidence
on the effect of restrictive covenants on Lucas' use of the land, see infra note 89
and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 1076 (Souter, J., statement that writ of certiorari should have been dis-
missed as having been granted improvidently).
89. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (discussing both pre- and post-
Lucas use of recreational use in assessing the impact of regulation on the value of
the land involved). The attorney for the state in Lucas stated at trial that he did
not know what effect the restrictive covenants on Isle of Palms might have on
what could be built on the site and offered no evidence as to other uses that might
be economically valuable-for example, he offered no evidence of recreational
value. Instead, the state relied exclusively on expert testimony concerning "sal-
vage value," which the expert said was the basis for answering that the property
had some value. This expert testimony was excluded because it was admittedly
"speculative." See DAVID LucAs, LucAs v. THE GREEN MACHME 107-09, 127-34
(1995) (containing selections from trial transcript).
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Because of the trial court's finding, Lucas also avoided the problem
of determining the proper approach where a regulation results in a
very substantial, but less than total, reduction in value. The majority
opinion often uses a term like "all" value or "total" loss to reflect this
finding.90 However, the opinion also uses descriptive terms like "eco-
nomically beneflcial,"91 "economically valuable,"92 and "economically
viable"93 to describe the uses that are totally lost. It is not clear
whether these alternative terms indicate that a loss in value that is
less than total, but approaches totality, falls within the per se test of
Lucas rather than within the balancing test identified by Penn Cen-
tral.94 The majority opinion also suggests uncertainty on this issue:
"[T]he landowner whose deprivation is one step short of complete...
might not be able to claim the benefit of our categorical
formulation."95
The problem of determining whether the right to build a residence
on the lot was a part of Lucas' title prior to the prohibition was ad-
dressed by remanding the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court
with this instruction:
[A]s it would be required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law
action for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background princi-
ples of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends in the
circumstances in which the property is presently found. Only on this showing
can the State fairly claim that, in proscribing all such beneficial uses, the
Beachfront Management Act is taking nothing.
9 6
The issue was then resolved by the South Carolina Supreme Court,
which ruled in Lucas' favor solely on the basis of this conclusory
analysis:
We have reviewed the record and heard arguments from the parties regarding
whether Coastal Council possesses the ability under the common law to pro-
hibit Lucas from constructing a habitable structure on his land. Coastal
Council has not persuaded us that any common law basis exists by which it
could restrain Lucas's desired use of his land; nor has our research uncovered
any such common law principle. 97
90. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 ("all economically beneficial or productive use"), 1017
("total deprivation of beneficial use"), 1018 ("all economically beneficial uses"),
1019 ("'all' economically beneficial uses"), 1020 ("valueless"), 1028 ("all economi-
cally valuable use").
91. Id. at 1015, 1017, 1019.
92. Id. at 1028.
93. Id. at 1016 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)), 1016 n.6
(quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495
(1987)).
94. For cases denying a right to compensation even though the regulation at issue
caused a substantial reduction in property value, see supra note 3.
95. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 1031-32.
97. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
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b. Pre-existing Rights and Limits
Identifying pre-existing rights is an ad hoc process because there is
no standard or test to determine whether a particular use was part of
the owner's "title to begin with." As indicated above,9 8 the common
law of nuisance addressed this issue by relying extensively on the
vague maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum no kedas. The majority in Lu-
cas rejected this approach as too question-begging and conclusory to
provide an "objective, value-free basis" for decisionmaking.9 9 For this
reason, the Court held that in order to win a takings case, the state
"must do more than proffer the legislature's declaration that the uses
... [at issue] are inconsistent with the public interest, or the con-
clusory assertion that they violate a common-law maxim such as sic
utere tuo ut alienum non lmdas."XO0
As an alternative to legislative declarations and sic utere, Justice
Scalia's opinion for the majority adopts a test based on tradition,
which he asserts provides a standard that: (1) is independent of the
statutes or judicial decisions of a state; and (2) provides a workable
guide to rights of ownership in the context of regulatory takings. Jus-
tice Scalia argues that "our 'takings' jurisprudence... has tradition-
ally been guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding the
content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of rights' that they
acquire when they obtain title to property."'o' To Scalia, this "consti-
tutional culture"10 2 provides a reasonable expectation standard: Some
limits are reasonably expected by citizens and are therefore proper;lOS
other limits are not reasonably expected and are therefore im-
98. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
99. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026. One of the puzzling aspects of Scalia's opinion is that,
after rejecting the concept of harm as too vague and conclusory to provide an
objective test of limits of property rights, the opinion then adopts common law
nuisance principles, including their use of the concept of harm from a use of land,
as the basis for an objective test. Id. at 1023-26, 1030-31. For criticisms of the
vagueness of nuisance law in other opinions in Lucas, see infra notes 112-18.
100. Id. at 1031. "[Noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regu-
latory takdngs'--which require compensation-from regulatory deprivations that
do not require compensation. A fortiori the legislature's recitation of a noxious-
use justification cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical rule that
total regulatory takings must be compensated." Id. at 1026.
101. Id. at 1027.
102. Id. at 1028.
103. See id. at 1027.
It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his
property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly
enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers; "[als long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power."
Id (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
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proper.1 0 4 As to the content of this cultural tradition, Justice Scalia
refers to "relevant property and nuisance principles,"10 5 to relevant
"background principles," 0 6 and to "common law principles."1 0 7
[Riegulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land... cannot
be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the
title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree
with such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result
that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other
uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the
State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public
generally, or otherwise. 1 0 8
In his concurring opinion in Lucas, Justice Kennedy also adopts a
culturally based standard, which he expresses in terms of "reasonable,
investment-backed expectations" to be used "[w]here a taking is al-
leged from regulations which deprive the property of all value."109
This approach is necessary to avoid "an inherent tendency towards
circularity...; for if the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped
by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority,
property tends to become what courts say it is."110 The cultural expec-
tation standard provides an independent test that makes it possible to
avoid this circularity because "[tihe expectations protected by the Con-
stitution are based on objective rules and customs that can be under-
stood as reasonable by all parties involved.""Il However, Justice
Kennedy disagrees with Justice Scalia's emphasis on the common law
nuisance principles as the basis for reasonable expectations as to
property rights.
In my view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole
of our legal tradition. The common law of nuisance is too narrow a confine for
the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interdependent society. The
State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in re-
sponse to changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expec-
tations whatever their source. The Takings Clause does not require a static
body of state property law; it protects private expectations to ensure private
investment.
1 1 2
104. See id. at 1030 ("When.. . a regulation that declares 'off-limits' all economically
productive or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background
principles would dictate, compensation must be paid to sustain it.").
105. Id. Specifically, Justice Scalia refers to "background principles of the state's law
of property and nuisance." Id. at 1029.
106. Id. at 1029-30.
107. Id. at 1031. Regulations may "duplicate the result that could have been achieved
in the courts." Id. at 1029.
108. Id. at 1029 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1035.
112. Id. (citation omitted).
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Nuisance law is also rejected as a test by Justice Blackmun,
1 3
Justice Stevens,1i4 and Justice Souter,'135 all of whom argue that com-
mon law nuisance is too narrow, vague, and uncertain to provide a
test for whether an owner had a preexisting right. For example, Jus-
tice Blackmun notes that nuisance law has been termed an "impene-
trable jungle" in which the term nuisance "has meant all things to all
people and has been applied indiscriminately,"'1 6 that "[tlhe Court it-
self has noted that 'nuisance concepts' are 'often vague and indetermi-
nate",11 7 and that it is not clear from the majority opinion "where our
'historical compact' or 'citizens' understanding' comes from."'is
The majority in Lucas had to be aware that common law nuisance
principles and cultural tradition do not provide a precise guide for
lower courts, regulators, and owners. The problems with using nui-
sance doctrine as a guide were explicitly noted in the other opin-
ions.119 Even Justice Scalia criticized the use of the circularity of the
sic utere test that underlies much of nuisance law.i 2o The vagueness
of "cultural tradition" was also noted by dissenting opinions. 121 Tradi-
tion cannot be used as a precise objective guide given the open-ended
time span involved,1 22 the wide variance in law among the states, and
the scale and diversity of our pluralistic society. These vagueness
problems are fundamental and pervasive. Consequently, the vague-
113. See id. at 1054-60 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent further
argues:
There simply is no reason to believe that new interpretations of the
hoary common-law nuisance doctrine will be particularly "objective" or
"value free." Once one abandons the level of generality of sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas, one searches in vain, I think, for anything resem-
bling a principle in the common law of nuisance.
Id. at 1055 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
114. See id. at 1067-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argues that the reli-
ance on a nuisance law will limit the courts to nineteenth century state of devel-
opment and prevent legal charges based on changing circumstances and new
knowledge. Id. at 1069-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1077-78 (Souter, J., statement of reasons to dismiss writ of certiorari).
116. Id. at 1055 n.19 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 616 (5th ed. 1984)).
117. Id. (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)).
118. Id. at 1055-56.
119. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
121. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1055-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see id. at 1034-35 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (arguing that Justice Scalia's emphasis on common law as a
basis of tradition is too narrow and that a broader, cultural expectation approach
should be used).
122. The majority opinion never indicates what time framework is contemplated. Ap-
parently, however, pre-constitutional traditions contrary to the court's interpre-
tation of the takings clause do not count. See id. at 1028 n.15.
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ness involved goes to the core of the test and is not limited to line-
drawing problems at the margins.1 23
The fundamental vagueness of culture plays an important role in
fulfilling the symbolic function in Lucas. As indicated above, Ameri-
can culture places a high value on individual rights and on protecting
the community welfare. Because there is no cultural agreement on
the resolution of conflicts between the two, particularly in the context
of regulatory takings, using culture as a test of rights performs the
symbolic function of affirming the conflicting values without explicitly
favoring property rights or regulation.
Moreover, this use of culture also helps support another powerful
symbol-the "rule of law." Many argue that under the rule of law,
judges must decide cases based on "objective" standards. More specifi-
cally, judges should not simply adopt their subjective view of what the
decision should be, particularly where they decide whether a govern-
mental unit must pay compensation as the price for pursuing a legiti-
mate government objective supported by the majority.1 24 The
assertion by the majority in Lucas that culture provides an objective,
independent test for rights is, in effect, an assertion that the decision
accords with this sense of the rule of law. However, culture is so di-
verse that it can justify almost any position on regulatory takings by
reference to some selected parts of the various contradictory cultural
views on rights. Limiting the analysis to "legal culture" does not sig-
nificantly reduce the diversity; statutes and cases are too vague and
contradictory to provide clear answers. Moreover, it is not clear what
counts as "legal." Does legal culture include works like the Declara-
tion of Independence, i25 John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, and Martin
Luther King's Letter from a Birmingham Jail?126 These are about
rights and about law even though they are not decisions by officials.
Thus, culture only appears to provide an objective basis to support a
decision about background rights, and this appearance of objectivity is
important to the symbolic affirmation of the rule of law.
123. Cf., e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12
(1982) (stating that the difficulty of distinguishing between permanent and tem-
porary physical invasions is not a valid objection to the categorical rule that a
permanent physical invasion is a taking because "this Court has not declined to
apply a per se rule simply because a court must, at the boundary of the rule, apply
the rule of reason and engage in a more complex balancing analysis." (second
emphasis added)).
124. See supra notes 15, 47 and accompanying text. Cf., e.g., Krier, supra note 7, 1150
(noting that the inherent uncertainty of the meaning of "taking" creates a prob-
lem because "[a]mbiguity and uncertainty... are likely to provoke unusual anxi-
ety when we sense them at the heart of our political-economic system").
125. See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF IN-
DEPENDENCE (1997).
126. THE CRY FOR FREEDOM 354 (Frank W. Hale, Jr. ed., 1969).
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However, this use of culture simply disguises the judges' use of
their own preferences in deciding cases.12 7 Even if a judge feels com-
pelled to decide a particular way because of some view of the culture,
this compulsion can only result because of some selection of the parts
of the culture that count. Culture, therefore, functions in the opinions
in the same manner as the curtain in front of the Wizard of Oz-i.e.,
culture enables judges to hide the facts (perhaps even from them-
selves) that there are no clear guides to decision-making and that they
are merely making up law as they go along. Culture can play an im-
portant role in constructing theories of justice, but only if one accepts
the limits of culture as a guide.128 Because of these limits, culture
cannot provide a standard that is objective in the sense that Justices
Scalia and Kennedy claim.
Fulfilling these symbolic functions has a high cost in terms of the
managerial role of the Supreme Court. Lucas achieves these symbolic
goals by asserting that property rights have an objective independent
basis in "culture" and that culture can, therefore, guide and limit
courts (including the Supreme Court) and legislatures. This assertion
"works" symbolically because it ignores the vagueness of culture as a
standard.129 However, from a managerial perspective, this vagueness
cannot be ignored because the vagueness of culture has forced (or ena-
bled) lower courts to develop their own interpretative applications of
the test.o30 The subjectivity hidden by the vagueness of the test will
become clearer if the Supreme Court explicitly rules that a state su-
preme court has erred in interpreting the state's own cultural back-
ground principles.1S1 However, this will occur very rarely because so
few lower court opinions are reviewed by the Supreme Court.
127. It has also been argued that culture is used as a basis for decision because the
rule of law is fostered by judicial decisions that are consistent with the views of
the culture. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 42, at 1399 (discussing an unpublished
paper by Frank Michelman). The assertion in the text above is radically differ-
ent. The text asserts that there is no single guiding cultural view on the complex-
ities of property rights; there are only conflicting views.
128. See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Justice, Creativity, and Popular Culture: The "Ju-
risprudence" of Mary Chapin Carpenter, 27 PAC. L.J. 1139, 1140-52 (1996).
129. Lucas does not indicate how one determines the content of culture. Lucas explic-
itly states that content is not determined by reference to the culture at the time
the Constitution was adopted because they "were out of accord with any plausible
interpretation of the takings clause." 505 U.S. at 1028 n.15. However, there is
virtually no guidance as to what does count.
130. For a discussion of the tests that have been adopted, see infra notes 172-93 and
accompanying text. As indicated in notes 237-43 and accompanying text, the Su-
preme Court recently decided that two of these tests were "wrong."
131. See supra note 42.
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C. Narrowness of the Test
In assessing the extent to which Lucas is managerial or symbolic,
it is important to consider how often the use of the per se total takings
category will require compensation. The majority notes that total tak-
ing situations are "extraordinary" and "relatively rare."13 2 Justice
Blackmun's dissent notes the "narrow scope" of the case and suggests
that the majority has launched "a missile to kill a mouse."1 33 None of
the opinions addresses a more precisely focused issue: How many in-
stances, if any, will exist where compensation would be required
under the total takings test but not under the balancing test of Penn
Central? There is, of course, no way to answer that question in a de-
finitive manner. However, it seems plausible to assume that there
will be many situations where the result would be the same under
either test. For example, a federal district court held, prior to Lucas,
that an owner in the exact position as Lucas had suffered a taking.
134
Justice Scalia seemed to think the results would be the same because
his justification of the total takings rule refers to Penn Central.1 3 5 In
any event, to the extent that there are very few such instances, Lucas
is a symbolic opinion that strongly endorses property rights but has
very little impact on regulation. From a managerial perspective, the
total taking test would, at best, provide some assistance in using the
Penn Central test in a few cases.
D. Conclusion: Symbolic Nature of the Test
The authors of the various opinions in Lucas were aware of three
facts. First, decisions by the Supreme Court in the regulatory takings
area are very rare in comparison to the number of decisions made by
regulators and lower courts. Second, the categorical test is extremely
vague because of the uncertainties resulting from identifying a "total"
loss, from the uncertainties in identifying the relevant denominator,
and from the need to determine whether a use was a part of the
owner's "title to begin with." Third, the total takings categorical test
was likely to have little impact because instances of total takings are
probably rare and the results under the Penn Central balancing test in
such cases would likely be the same. Given the court's awareness of
these three facts and given that all the opinions endorsed the values of
both private property rights and public regulation of those rights, Lu-
cas is properly viewed as a symbolic opinion rather than substantive
and managerial. To the extent that Lucas fulfills a managerial role,
132. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18.
133. Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. See Chavous v. S.C. Coastal Council, 745 F. Supp. 1168 (D.S.C. 1990), vacating as
moot Esposito v. S.C. Coastal Council, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991).
135. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
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the total takings test is, at best, only slightly less vague and open-
ended than the ad hoc balancing test. Consequently, the problems of
uncertainty and of delegation of power that result from the ad hoc bal-
ancing test also exist with the total takings test.
IV. IMPACT OF THE TOTAL TAKINGS TEST: MANAGERIAL
FAILURE AS A RESULT OF UNCERTAINTY
AND LIMITED EFFECT
In addition to comparing the symbolic versus managerial functions
of the total takings test by a conceptual analysis of Lucas, it is also
necessary to consider lower court decisions to determine whether it
has provided managerial guidance. This Article analyzes several
groups of cases to assess this effect: (1) a selection of cases illustrating
how the issues raised by the total takings test have been addressed;
(2) all the South Carolina cases applying Lucas; and (3) a random se-
lection of cases citing Lucas. Assessing the effect of the total takings
test is difficult because there is no objective way to determine what
the results would have been if Lucas had not adopted the test. For
example, because a total taking would have a substantial impact
under the ad hoc balancing test of Penn Central, it is impossible to
know whether a court which finds that a Lucas taking has occurred
would have reached the same result under Penn Central. At another
level, the symbolic language about per se categorical tests may have
had the effect of causing regulators to be less restrictive of develop-
ment in order to avoid possible liability for compensation under a test
that was perceived as granting increased substantive protection to
owners. Given these problems, the assessment of the effect of Lucas
will, of necessity, be somewhat impressionistic. Nevertheless, the
paucity of findings of a total taking and the lack of agreement in appli-
cation of important parts of Lucas indicate that the total taking test
has had very little impact in terms of providing managerial
guidance.' 3 6
A. Cases mustrating Treatment of Issues Raised by Test
The problems recognized, but avoided, in Lucas have presented dif-
ficulties in the lower courts. More specifically, the courts have ad-
dressed problems with defining the denominator, with identifying
136. Other reviews of the impact of Lucas also conclude that the case has had little
impact. See, e.g., Coursen, supra note 10; Robert L. Glicksman, Making a Nui-
sance of Takings Law, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & Po.'y 149 (2000); Ronald H. Rosenberg,
The Non-impact of the United States Regulatory Takings Cases on the State
Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FoRDHi ENvrrL. L.J. 523
(1995); Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: The Cate-
gorical and Other "Exceptions" to Liability for Fifth Amendment Takings of Pri-
vate Property Far Outweigh the "Rule," 29 ENvTI. L. 939 (1999).
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situations where the land has no value as a result of the regulation,
and with determining preexisting rights.
1. Denominator Problems
Though all three types of denominator problems have presented
difficulties, most of the cases have focused on the problem of whether
the denominator is the limited parcel affected by the regulation or a
larger parcel, which includes the regulated parcel. Where a parcel is
unsubdivided, the courts generally refuse to treat only the regulated
portion of the parcel as the denominator. Instead, the entire parcel is
used.1 3 7
Where the property has been subdivided and all of one of the subdi-
vided parcels is affected, the courts have adopted various approaches
to the issue of whether to use the larger undivided parcel or the
smaller subdivided parcel as the denominator. One important factor
is whether the subdivided parcel has been sold. Where the parcel has
been subdivided and a single subdivided lot has been sold to a new
owner, there is a tendency to use the new owner's subdivided portion
as the denominator in any claim by the new owner.i 38 Where the
original owner retains the subdivided parcels, the courts sometimes
adopt an ad hoc approach with very little reasoning, and the results
can be hard to reconcile.13 9 At least one court has adopted a per se
test that uses the subdivided land subject to regulation as the parcel
137. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602,
642-44 (1993) ("[A] claimant's parcel... [cannot] be divided into what was taken
and what was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of the former to be
complete and hence compensable."); K&K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res.,
575 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Mich. 1998) (providing that under "nonsegmentation' prin-
ciple.., the effect of the taking must be viewed with respect to the parcel as a
whole."); Quirk v. Town of New Boston, 663 A.2d 1328, 1332-33 (N.H. 1995);
Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 532-34 (Wis. 1996). Cf., e.g., Adams
Outdoor Adver. v. City of East Lansing, 614 N.W.2d 634, 638-39 (Mich. 2000)
(holding that the owner cannot create a smaller denominator by leasing narrow
parcels of or interests in his property). These cases are consistent with pre-Lucas
authorities. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 497-98 (1987) (rejecting the division of parcel into segments); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) ("'Taking' jurispru-
dence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to deter-
mine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated....
[Tihis court focuses.., on ... the parcel as a whole .... ."). As indicated in note 71
and accompanying text, the entire parcel is used in evaluating the impact of set-
back and landscaping requirements.
138. See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37 (1994) (treating a single lot in a
residential subdivision as denominator).
139. Compare, e.g., FIC Homes of Blackstone, Inc. v. Conservation Comm'n of Black-
stone, 673 N.E.2d 61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (addressing a takings claim by a de-
veloper/subdivider by treating all of a subdivided thirty-eight-lot parcel as a
single parcel), with, e.g., Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994) (address-
ing a takings claim by a developer/subdivider by treating a single subdivided lot
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so long as the subdivided parcel had a value "separate and apart from
any contiguous land that was owned" by the owner involved.140 Many
courts have explicitly adopted a multifactor balancing approach to the
problem of a subdivided parcel that is part of a larger parcel owned by
a single owner. Under this approach, the court looks at a variety of
factors, including unity of ownership of contiguous lots, "the degree of
contiguity, the dates of acquisition, the extent to which the parcel has
been treated as a single unit, [and] the extent to which the protected
lands enhance the value of remaining lands."141 Thus, most courts
have adopted "a flexible approach, designed to account for factual nu-
ances" 14 2 and "to identify the parcel as realistically and fairly as possi-
ble, given the entire factual and regulatory environment."1 43
It should also be noted that Penn Central indicates that, under the
balancing test, it is proper to consider the rights given in exchange for
the regulation imposed on a parcel, which allow the owner to more
intensively develop parcels in the vicinity of the affected parcel.144 It
is not clear whether this approach would apply in determining
whether there has been a total taking. Justice Scalia has explicitly
criticized the Penn Central approach to development rights.145 How-
ever, the Court arguably adopted the approach in Suitum v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agencyl46 because the Court considered whether
the government decisions concerning the development rights were
final.
The cases addressing the property right aspect of the denominator
problem have an ad hoc quality. One understandable approach is to
as the parcel but finding that the total limitation on development inhered in the
title itself).
140. Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 719 A.2d 19, 28 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1998).
141. K&K Constr., Inc., 575 N.W.2d at 536 (quoting Ciampitti v. United States, 22
Fed. Cl. 310, 318-19 (1991)).
142. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
143. K&K Constr. Inc., 575 N.W.2d at 536-37.
144. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 137 (Penn Central's air rights have been "made trans-
ferable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two of
which have been found suitable for the construction of new office buildings....
[Tihe rights afforded are valuable. While these rights may well not have consti-
tuted just compensation' if a 'taking' had occurred, the rights nevertheless un-
doubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on
appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the
impact of regulation.").
145. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (criticizing the approach of Penn Central as "ex-
treme" and "unsupportable"); see also Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
520 U.S. 725, 750 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (providing that the relevance of
development rights "is limited to the compensation side of the takings analysis,
and ... taking them into account in determining whether a taking has occurred
will render much of our takings jurisprudence a nullity").
146. 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
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focus on the treatment of the interest under the applicable state
law.i 47 However, as indicated above,' 4 there are problems with this
use of state property law. At times, the cases exhibit a somewhat ran-
dom quality in their approach to these problems. For example, two
cases determine that the right to build a pier is not a separate inter-
est, but adopt very different approaches in reaching the result. These
two cases are in different states, and one involved a large pier to be
built in the oceani 4 9 while the other involved a dock to be constructed
along a river.'5 0 However, whatever the reasons for the difference in
approach in these two cases, the fact remains that the interest at issue
was determined on an ad hoc basis.
Despite these uncertainties concerning this type of denominator
problem, there is considerable agreement that, where zoning is in-
volved, there is no independent right to use land for any particular
purpose. Consequently, so long as the owner has some reasonable re-
turn on the investment in the land, there is no taking simply because
the owner has suffered a "total loss" of another zoning use classifica-
tion that would generate a higher return.' 5 ' Thus, the hypothetical
problem raised above about rezoning of land from residential to com-
merciali52 would not be treated as a total taking of the right to com-
mercial use.
An example of the third type of denominator problem was
presented in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency,i 5 3 in which the plaintiffs, noting that Lucas
involved a temporary total taking, claimed a temporary total taking
for the period of time a total moratorium on their development was in
effect. The court refused to accept the owners' view that the denomi-
nator was "the temporary 'slice' of each fee that covers the time span
during which" the moratorium was in effect.' 5 4 Instead of such "con-
147. See, e.g., Machipongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 719 A.2d 19,28-29 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998) (recognizing that the "coal estate" is one of three distinct sepa-
rate estates in land under Pennsylvania law, but holding that fact issues re-
mained as to the impact of regulation on the owner's coal estate).
148. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
149. See Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 523
S.E.2d 193, 200 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the right to build a pier is not a
separate right), af/d on other grounds, 548 S.E.2d 595 (S.C. 2001) (finding no
taking occurred because the owner claimed only a temporary taking and because
the delay involved was a normal regulatory delay).
150. See Karam v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 705 A.2d 1221, 1225-28 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1998) (holding that a "riparian grant" of right to build a pier is not a
separate right).
151. See, e.g., 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLAN-
NING § 6.05 (rev. ed. 2001).
152. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
153. 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001).
154. Id. at 774.
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ceptual severance in the temporal dimension of property rights,"1 5 5
the court concluded that the "'use' of the plaintiffs' property runs from
the present to the future"1 5 6 and that the moratorium "denied the
plaintiffs only a small portion of this future stream."157 This approach
to the application of Lucas has, in effect, been used in a number of
other cases involving fixed term moratoria.1 5 8 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has arguably approved temporary total takings that "would
arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits,
changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like."'159
Despite these authorities, moratoria on all development are argua-
bly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recognition of claims for
temporary takings and its treatment of cases involving a loss for a
specified time of interest on a monetary fimd.160 An alternative ap-
proach to the temporal denominator problem is indicated by the dis-
sent to the denial of plaintiffs' petition for rehearing en banc in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council. The dissenters argued:
[There is no clear-cut distinction between a permanent prohibition and a tem-
porary one. Governmental policy is inherently temporary while land is time-
less. Even a permanent prohibition can be rescinded and, in the fullness of
time, almost certainly will be. The land may retain market value based on
speculation that it will someday become usable because the regulation will be
revoked.161
The dissent also noted that a series of "temporary" moratoria could
have substantially the same effect as a permanent total taking.16 2
Some courts have, in effect, adopted the view of this dissent because
they have required compensation in situations where, in order to
abate a public nuisance, an owner who is innocent of any wrongful
155. Id. at 775-76.
156. Id. at 782.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Santa Fe Vill. Venture v. City of Albequerque, 914 F. Supp. 478, 483
(D.N.M. 1995); Williams v. City of Central, 907 P.2d 701, 704 (Colo. Ct. App.
1995); Woodbury Place Partners v. City of Woodbury, 492 N.W.2d 258 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992).
159. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987).
160. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., Inc., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (holding that
the interest is private property for purposes of the takings clause); Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) (finding a taking of
interest on funds deposited in court).
161. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998,
1001 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). For opposing arguments con-
cerning the distinction between permanent and temporary physical invasions,
see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 n.12 (de-
fending distinction), 448-49 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing
distinction).
162. Id. at 1001-22.
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conduct is totally denied the use of his property for a period of time.163
The competing views concerning moratoria should be addressed next
year because the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Tahoe-Si-
erra Preservation Council.164 As indicated in the Conclusion to this
Article, the Supreme Court should resolve the issue on the basis of a
candid pragmatic balancing test, not a formal categorical approach
like that used in Lucas.
2. Value of Permitted Uses
The Lucas majority avoided the problem of determining the value
of any permitted uses of the lots at issue by accepting the trial court's
finding that there was no value remaining.165 Many subsequent cases
have been unable to avoid this problem, and these cases have often
been generous to the government in determining value. For example,
many courts have held that the recreational uses of a parcel had a
market value and that this value was sufficient to avoid the categori-
cal total takings rule.166 This approach is consistent with pre-Lucas
163. See, e.g., City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen, 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that a total taking resulted from a year-long closing of an apartment
building and noting that the order prohibited all use, not just the sale or use of
drugs on the premises); State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah, 702 N.E.2d 81, 88 (Ohio
1998) ("The fact that the order [of closure of the real property] is of limited dura-
tion does not change this conclusion [that the owner has suffered a Lucas loss of
all economically beneficial use]."). But cf., e.g., City of Minneapolis v. Fisher, 504
N.W.2d 520 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that an abatement order closing the
sauna for one year was not a taking because it was temporary and the owner did
not suffer a total taking because residential units in the same building could be
rented); State v. Ramey, No. 99CA0002, 1999 WL 957650 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 3,
1999) (upholding a year-long injunction because of evidence of negligent or know-
ing acquiescence by the owner of the public nuisance resulting from violations of
liquor regulations at the tavern).
164. 121 S. Ct. 2589 (2001) (granting certiorari "limited to the following question:
'Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary morato-
rium on land development does not constitute a taking of property requiring com-
pensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution?'").
165. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., State v. Burgess, 772 So. 2d 540, 543-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (rec-
ognizing the value of recreational use of land at issue and holding that Lucas did
not reject "recreational use as an economically beneficial use"); Wyer v. Bd. of
Envtl. Prot., 747 A.2d 192, 193 (Me. 2000) (holding that the trial court "properly
considered the use of the property for parking, picnics, barbecues and other recre-
ational uses as beneficial uses available to" the owner despite denial of the vari-
ance that would have allowed construction prohibited by the sand dune laws);
Darack v. Mazrimas, 5 Mass. L. Rptr. 469 (Super. Ct. 1996) ([A]pplication of
flood plain zoning ... does not constitute a de facto taking [under Lucas] even
though the property owner is left with only exceedingly limited use of a parcel,
such as agricultural, horticultural, or recreational uses."). It is interesting to
note that the government does not always make this argument. See, e.g., Mc-
Queen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 530 S.E.2d 628, 631 (S.C. 2000) (stating that it
was "uncontested that permit denial ... deprives respondent of all economically
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decisions holding that recreational uses were sufficient to constitute a
reasonable remaining use.1 67 The United States Court of Federal
Claims has occasionally been more generous to owners in addressing
this issue. For example, one case refused to place any value on recrea-
tional use of waterfront property.' 68 In addition, once the owner has
established a prima facie case of a total taking, the Court of Claims
explicitly shifts to the government the burden of producing evidence of
some remaining value.169
Lucas also used the trial court's finding of total loss to avoid the
problem of determining whether a taking that approached, but did not
reach, 100% of the value of the parcel would be treated under the per
se rule. Though lower courts have generally stated the rule as apply-
ing only to situations where there is a loss of all value,llo very few
decisions explicitly address the question of a loss that approaches
100% of value.' 7 '
3. Pre-existing Rights and Limits
a. Approaches
The courts have used three approaches, sometimes as alternative
grounds, in addressing whether a particular use was part of the
owner's "title to begin with." The first approach asks whether, under
the State's background principles of property law, any owner in the
chain of title had a right to the use at issue.7 2 This approach focuses
viable use of his property" along the manmade salt-water canal), cert. granted
and case remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2581 (2001).
167. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing cases where
recreational remaining uses prevented the finding of a taking); First English Ev-
angelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr.
893, 904 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding that "agricultural and recreational uses" were
reasonable remaining uses); ZmGLER,, supra note 151 at 7-98, n.17 (listing cases
relying on modest economic uses as reasonable remaining uses).
168. See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 48 (1994) (treating the right to
"set up a tent" on a lot along a canal in a subdivision as valueless).
169. See id. at 47-48.
170. See, e.g., Cohen v. City of Hartford, 710 A.2d 746, 754-55 (Conn. 1998) (balancing
test found applicable unless regulation results in "a practical confiscation"); Ste-
vens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 460 (Or. 1993) ("all economically
viable use"); Palazzolo v. State ex rel Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 715 (R.I. 2000) ("all
beneficial use"), affd on finding of no total taking but rev'd on other grounds, 121
S. Ct. 2448 (2001); Bd. of Supervisors of Prince William County v. Omni Homes,
Inc., 481 S.E.2d 460, 464 (Va. 1997) ("all economic use"); Guimont v. Clarke, 854
P.2d 1, 34 (Wash. 1993) ("all economically viable use").
171. See, e.g., K&K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 575 N.W.2d 531, 539 n.13
(Mich. 1998) (holding that leaving the owner with only "a small fraction of the
economic value" is not a categorical taking).
172. See, e.g., State Dep't of Health v. Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1002 (Colo. 1995) (holding,
as an alternative ground to the owner being on notice that regulatory controls
would be imposed, that "relevant Colorado common law principles would not per-
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only on whether any owner would have had the right. It does not mat-
ter whether the owner challenging the regulation acquired title before
or after the regulation was adopted. The second approach focuses on a
chronological question: Was the limitation at issue adopted before or
after the owner claiming a taking acquired title? If the owner ac-
quired title after the limitation was adopted, the courts conclude that
the use limited by the regulation was never part of his title.173 Occa-
sionally, a court will combine the first and second approaches as alter-
native grounds. The third approach adopts a two-step analysis which
starts with the following question: Did the owner have a reasonable
investment-backed expectation of using the land in the manner at is-
sue? If the answer to this question is "no," then there is no taking. If
the answer to this question is "yes," then (and only then), the court
proceeds to determine whether a Lucas total taking is involved.
The basis for the second and third approaches is that there is no
reasonable investment-backed expectation if the owner acquires prop-
erty after the restriction is adopted or with notice that the restriction
was likely to be adopted. This lack is viewed as fatal to any taking
claim because, as stated in Good v. United States174: "Reasonable, in-
vestment-backed expectations are an element of every regulatory tak-
mit a landowner to engage in activities that spread radioactive contamination");
Karam v. State Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 705 A.2d 1221, 1228-29 (N.J. 1998) (holding,
under the public trust doctrine, the owner never had an "absolute right to con-
struct a dock."). See, e.g., Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 316-17 (N.Y.
1997) (relying, as an alternative ground, on preexisting common law obligations
of owners, in addition to the view that the owners had no right to object to perma-
nent physical invasion by the government because regulatory action was based
on a preexisting ordinance). Cf, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d
449, 453 (Or. 1993) (holding that the owner was not denied all economic use and
that this use was never a part of the owner's title); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 530 S.E.2d 628, 631 n.2 (S.C. 2000) (declining to address application of
public trust doctrine to alleged taking because the taking issue was resolved
against the owner on grounds of "notice").
173. See, e.g., Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa 1994) (involving regula-
tory provision that "was in existence and therefore part of Iowa's property law
some twelve years before the plaintiffs purchased the land in question"); Karam,
705 A.2d at 1229 (noting that there was never an "absolute right to construct a
dock" and that more stringent environmental restriction "was a matter of public
record long before plaintiffs purchased the property"); Palazzolo v. State ex rel
Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 715-16 (R.I. 2000) (discussed further in notes 217-61 and
accompanying text); City of Virginia Beach v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414,418 (Va. 1998)
(stating that inquiry into "nuisance or property law preceding the Ordinance...
is irrelevant and unnecessary since ... [the owner] acquired property already
burdened by regulatory restrictions."); infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
Cf, e.g., Kim, 681 N.E.2d at 315-16 (denying claim for permanent physical inva-
sion by the government on the basis of a preexisting ordinance and noting that
"in identifying the background rules of State property law that inhere in an
owner's title, a court should look to the law in force, whatever its source, when
the owner acquired the property").
174. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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ings case.... The Lucas Court did not hold that the denial of all
economically beneficial or productive use of land eliminates the re-
quirement that the landowner have reasonable, investment-backed
expectations of developing his land."175 Frequently, these two ap-
proaches are phrased in terms of notice of a regulatory restriction.
Under this conceptualization, if the regulation prohibiting a use had
been adopted at the time the owner acquired title or foreseeably would
be adopted before development, then the owner has notice of the re-
striction and could not, therefore, have a reasonable investment-
backed expectation of using the land in the prohibited manner.1 76
The third approach is effectively the same as the second approach
except for two distinctions. First, it is not necessary under the third
approach that the regulatory prohibition actually be adopted before
acquisition of title. If a person buys property subject to a highly regu-
lated scheme, that person is on notice that a new, more restrictive reg-
ulation may be adopted after the purchase. In view of the regulatory
climate and the resulting notice of restrictive change, a court could
find that there was no reasonable expectation of no new restrictions
and thus no taking, even if a subsequently adopted regulation denies
all economic use.177 Second, in cases where the regulation was
adopted before the owner acquired title but the owner does not have
actual notice of the regulation, then it must be shown that "construc-
tive notice exists in the sense that a reasonable person would have
known of the restriction at the time of acquisition of title."17
8
b. Discussion
If one relies solely on the opinion in Lucas, it is not clear which
alternative or alternatives are correct. The second approach provides
a clear categorical answer, and such certainty is consistent with the
concern in Lucas for per se rules. However, both the second and the
175. Id. at 1361 (emphasis added).
176. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Entitlement to Substantive Due Process: Old Ver-
sus New Property in Land Use Regulation, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'y 61, 85-92
(2000).
177. See Good, 189 F.3d 1355; State Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Burgess, 772 So. 2d 540,
543-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); McQueen, 530 S.E.2d 628 (S.C. 2000), vacated
and remanded sub nom. McQueen v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 121 S.
Ct. 2581 (2001) (mem.). See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231
F.3d 1365, 1367-70 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting from denial of peti-
tion for rehearing en banc); State v. Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 999-1001 (Colo. 1994)
(holding that it was not reasonable to expect no increase in requirements de-
signed to accomplish background goals); Karam, 705 A.2d at 1228-29 (finding
that it was not reasonable to expect no changes in the law); Patricia A. Hageman,
Fifth Amendment Takings Issues Raised by Section 9 of the Endangered Species
Act, 9 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 375, 387-92 (1994); Sugameli, supra note 136, at
972-84.
178. Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 51 (1994).
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third approaches appear contrary to the concern of Lucas to provide a
limit on the ability of government to "take" property simply by chang-
ing the rules. If a regulation can avoid the effect of the per se total
takings rule (and even avoid the need for applying the Penn Central
balancing test) so long as the regulation is adopted prior to acquisition
or is foreseeable at the time of acquisition, then property rights be-
come what the regulations have said (or foreseeably will say). This
result seems to be precisely the circularity that Lucas 79 and other
casesi 8 0 attempt to prevent. Moreover, the idea that rights disappear
based on this chronological basis results in potentially difficult puzzles
such as when did the rights "disappear" and who would have a
claim.' 8 i Thus, it is not surprising that the second and third ap-
proaches have been criticized by commentators 8 2 and rejected by
some courts. For example, Palm Beach Isles Association v. United
States'8 3 rejected the third approach and stated that statements
about the necessity of reasonable, investment-backed expectations in
Good v. United States'8 4 were dictum. "[I]n accord with Lucas, and
not inconsistent with any prior holdings of this court, when a regula-
tory taking, properly determined to be categorical, is found to have
occurred, the property owner is entitled to a recovery without regard
to consideration of investment-backed expectations."' 8 5
179. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.2 (1987), ("[The
owners' rights are not] altered because they acquired the land well after the Com-
mission had begun to implement its policy. So long as the Commission could not
have deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating them, the
prior owners must be understood to have transferred their fifll property rights in
conveying the lot."); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
164 (1980) ("[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into pub-
lic property without compensation ....").
181. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1537-38 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For
arguments that the pre-regulation owner should have a takings claim, see, for
example, Gregory M. Stein, Who Gets the Takings Claim? Changes in Land Use
Law, Pre-Enactment Owners, and Post-Enactment Buyers, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 89
(2000).
182. For arguments that these approaches are contrary to Lucas, see Eagle, supra
note 15 at 381-90; R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Ex-
pectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 449 (2001). For a
more general criticism of this approach, see Stephen E. Abraham, Windfalls or
Windmills: The Right of a Property Owner to Challenge Land Use Regulations (A
Call to Critically Reexamine the Meaning of Lucas), 13 J. LAND USE & ENVL. L.
161, 194 (1997). For articles that appear to assume that these approaches are
consistent with Lucas and with general principles underlying the takings clause,
see Mandelker, supra note 176; Page, supra note 7.
183. 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000), order in response to petition for rehearing, 231
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
184. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). For a discussion of these statements in Good, see
supra note 174 and accompanying text.
185. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
[Vol. 80:465
20011 PALAZZOLO, LUCAS, AND PENN CENTRAL 503
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion arguably
supports the third approach because it states: "The finding of no value
must be considered under the Takings Clause by reference to the
owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations .... Where a
taking is alleged from regulations which deprive the property of all
value, the test must be whether the deprivation is contrary to reasona-
ble, investment-backed expectations."1 8 6 Moreover, the temporal
statements in the majority opinion are not sufficiently precise to bar
the adoption of the second and third approaches. For example, the
opinion states that limits on the title must inhere "in the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already places upon land ownership."' 8 7 Similarly, Lucas states that
"[in the case of land, . . . the notion ... that title is somehow held
subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may subsequently
eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the histor-
ical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of
our constitutional culture."18 Thus, one could read the concern in
Lucas for background principles to be applicable only where the regu-
lation was adopted after the owner acquired title.
Although the first approach avoids these problems, it raises other
problems. One problem is the vagueness involved in determining
background principles. Given this vagueness, the problems of uncer-
tainty and delegation resulting from the Penn Central test will re-
main. There will also be disputes over whether the state courts have
improperly claimed that the law has always prohibited the uses at is-
sue. For example, in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 18 9 owners of
beachfront lots claimed that a taking resulted from a regulation
prohibiting sea walls in the "dry sand area" of the beach. The Oregon
Supreme Court rejected the claim because, under the "doctrine of cus-
tom," the public had a right of access to the dry sand area and there-
fore "exclusive use of the dry sand areas was not a part of the 'bundle
of rights'" the owners acquired. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
In his dissent to this denial, Justice Scalia argued that the Oregon
Supreme Court's position was "unsupportable"19o and that Supreme
Court review was necessary. "Our opinion in Lucas . . . would be a
nullity if anything that a state court chooses to denominate 'back-
ground law'-regardless of whether it is really such-could eliminate
186. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (S.C. 1992).
187. Id. at 1029 (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).
189. 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993).
190. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). Part of Justice Scalia's objection was that, in an earlier
case that was central to the decision in Stevens, "the Supreme Court of Oregon
appears to have misread Blackstone in applying the law of custom." Id. at 1212
n.5.
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property rights."lgi Given the possibility that this may be the case,
"petitioners must be afforded an opportunity to make out their consti-
tutional claim by demonstrating that the asserted custom is
pretextual. "192
Thus, it has been difficult, if not impossible, to determine in the
years following Lucas which of the three approaches is correct or when
an approach has been misused. Lucas does not provide clear guidance
on this issue. This lack of guidance results partly from imprecise
phrasings in the majority opinion and from Justice Kennedy's using
the phrase "reasonable investment-backed expectations" without clar-
ifying how the phrase would apply to subsequent cases. More funda-
mentally, this lack of a clear reading of Lucas is the result of a failure
to confront the basic cultural conflict over the proper balance of rights
and duties of landowners. Given this conflict, the culture cannot pro-
vide an independent test or basis for property rights.193 For example,
it is not possible to "prove" or "disprove" whether our culture has
"adopted" the following proposition: Rules must change as circum-
stances change, and people who buy property with knowledge of a re-
cently enacted limitation cannot complain because: (1) any hardship is
the result of the choice to purchase with actual or constructive knowl-
edge of the restriction; and (2) the purchase price must have reflected
the limitation on land use and it would be a windfall to remove the
restriction.
B. Case Study: South Carolina
Because Lucas arose in South Carolina, the South Carolina experi-
ence with Lucas provides a useful case study of the application of Lu-
cas. South Carolina first addressed the application of Lucas in
determining on remand whether there were "background principles of
nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses [Lucas] now intends
in the circumstances in which the priority is presently found."194 As
indicated above, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded, with
no analysis or discussion, that no "common law basis exists . . . [to]
restrain Lucas's desired use of his land."195
In the years since this decision by the South Carolina Supreme
Court, the South Carolina appellate courts have issued opinions in
nine cases involving the application of Lucas.1 96 None of these cases
found that a regulatory taking occurred. Five of the cases found that
191. Id. at 1211 (emphasis added).
192. Id. at 1214 (emphasis added).
193. See supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
194. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031-32.
195. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992).
196. There is also a published federal district court opinion, McMahan v. International
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers, 858 F. Supp. 529
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the total takings test was not applicable because the taking was not
total,1 97 and four cases (including a case involving a total loss of
value)'9 8 held that there was no preexisting right to the use at
issue.19 9
Most of the cases finding that there was no total taking do not ex-
plicitly address the denominator problem. Instead, they simply state
that the property had some economic value despite the regulation at
issue.2 00 One case addressed the property interest aspect of the de-
nominator problem and held that the right to build a pier was simply
a "stick" in the "bundle of sticks," not "a property interest in itself,"201
and that "[tihe pier is but one piece of the whole" parcel.2 02
Three of the cases finding that there was no preexisting right in-
volved the Coastal Council. 20 3 Two of these cases apparently involved
partial takings and relied on the approach that determines the exis-
tence of preexisting rights by focusing on when the owner acquired the
property and held that, because the regulation at issue was enacted
before the owner acquired title, there was no pre-existing right and
thus there could be no taking.2 04 It is interesting to note that, in an
unreported lower court opinion, a trial court used a similar theory in
holding that, because the purchase occurred after the regulation had
been adopted, a subsequent purchaser of the property involved in Lu-
cas had no preexisting right to build erosion control barriers to avoid
(D.S.C. 1994). McMahan held that Lucas was not applicable to a takings chal-
lenge involving union funds. See id. at 542.
197. See Main v. Thomason, 535 S.E.2d 918 (S.C. 2000); Quality Towing, Inc. v. City of
Myrtle Beach, 530 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 2000); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeown-
ers Ass'n, Inc. v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 523 S.E.2d 193 (S.C. 1999); Staubes v.
City of Folly Beach, 500 S.E.2d 160 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), affd on appeal of differ-
ent issue, 529 S.E.2d 543 (S.C. 2000); Long Cove Club Assocs. v. Town of Hilton
Head Island, 458 S.E.2d 757 (S.C. 1995).
198. See McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 530 S.E.2d 628 (S.C. 2000), vacated and
remanded sub nom. McQueen v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 121 S. Ct.
2581 (2001) (mem.).
199. See Westside Quik Shop, Inc. v. Stewart, 534 S.E.2d 270 (S.C. 2000); McQueen,
530 S.E.2d 628; Wooten v. S.C. Coastal Council, 510 S.E.2d 716 (S.C. 1999);
Grant v. S.C. Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388 (S.C. 1995).
200. See Main, 535 S.E.2d at 922; Quality Towing, 530 S.E.2d at 373-74; Staubes, 500
S.E.2d at 165-66; Long Cove Club Assocs., 458 S.E.2d at 758.
201. Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n, 523 S.E.2d at 200.
202. Id. at 203.
203. The fourth case, which involved video poker machines that became useless in
South Carolina after the state enacted legislation prohibiting possession of the
machines, relied upon the theory that persons in a highly regulated field have no
reasonable, investment-backed expectation that such changes in the law will not
occur. Westside Quik Shop, Inc. v. Stewart, 534 S.E.2d 270 (S.C. 2000). The
Coastal Council functions are now performed by the South Carolina Department
of Health and Environmental Control. See McQueen, 530 S.E.2d at 629 n.1.
204. Wooten, 510 S.E.2d 716; Grant, 461 S.E.2d 388. For a discussion of the use of this
approach in other jurisdictions, see supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
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the loss of the use of the land for a house.205 The third Coastal Coun-
cil case relied on the "notice" approach to hold that there was no tak-
ing, even though there was a total loss of economic value as a result of
a regulation adopted after the owner acquired title, because there was
no legitimate investment-backed expectation of being able to develop
the land.206
C. Random Selection of Cases Citing Lucas
In order to reduce the subjectivity that occurs when cases are se-
lected to address an issue or to illustrate a point, a random selection of
cases citing Lucas was examined. The cases were selected by using
the Westlaw Keycite feature to generate a list of the cases citing Lu-
cas.2 07 One hundred and ten cases (one-sixth of the 658 cases citing
Lucas) were selected randomly and reviewed.20 A copy of the review
sheet used for this process is included as Appendix 1 to this Article.
Appendix 2 contains a tabular summary of results. The table indi-
cates, for example, that only three of the 110 cases surveyed found
that a total taking was involved. None of these three cases involved
traditional land use or other similar administrative actions. Two in-
volved the abatement of a public nuisance in the form of houses where
narcotics were used by nonowners.20 9 The owners of the buildings
were innocent of wrongdoing, and the abatement orders involved a to-
tal prohibition of any use of the building, not just some form of crimi-
nal use. The third case involved a dispute between the owner and the
United States Forest Service over the title to a gravel pit. 2 1 0 The
court found a taking because, instead of using the approaches a pri-
vate party would use, the Forest Service had "utilized threats backed
by its sovereign power to prevent plaintiff from operating in the
pit."21
205. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VIcKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERuAs 209-10 (2d ed. 2000). For accounts of the settlement proceedings be-
tween Lucas and the State and the Coastal Council's sale of the two lots, see
LucAs, supra note 89, at 249-52; Gideon Kanner, Not with a Bang, but a Giggle:
The Settlement of the Lucas Case, in TAMINGS: LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDrrIoNs
AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUcAS 308 (David L. Callies ed.,
1996).
206. McQueen, 530 S.E.2d at 633-35. For a discussion of the use of this approach in
other jurisdictions, see supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
207. The keycite list was generated on February 20, 2001.
208. The random selection was done by using a random number table to select a case
from the first six cases on the list. Every sixth case on the rest of the list was
then selected and reviewed.
209. See City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen, 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
State ex rel Pizza v. Rezcallah, 702 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio 1998).
210. See, Pettro v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 136 (2000).
211. Id. at 150.
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The reasons for the cases' lack of a finding of a taking are informa-
tive. Many cases do not address the merits of the takings claim; in-
stead Lucas is cited as a general proposition (32 cases) or the issue is
determined not to be ripe or is otherwise not explicitly addressed (21
cases). Of the cases that address the merits, 27 cases conclude that
Lucas does not apply because the taking is not total and 14 cases find
that the use at issue was not part of the owner's property to begin
with. The size of this last category is interesting when compared to
the small number of cases finding a total taking. This difference in
size suggests that the Lucas "test" of whether the owner never had the
right at issue may have had an unexpectedly large negative impact on
owners.
The survey also illustrates the diversity of situations involving tak-
ings claims. Though many of the cases citing Lucas involved environ-
mental schemes, wetlands (13 cases) and coastal protection schemes
(6 cases) were not as common as might be expected. There were more
zoning cases (26) than cases involving these environmental categories.
The largest single category of governmental program is "Other," which
includes such diverse types of governmental action as taxation, 2 12
freezing of a foreign bank's assets by presidential order,213 rent con-
trol,214 navigable waters, 2 15 and utility hookup requirements.2 16
V. PALAZZOLO V. RHODE ISLAND: THE LIMITS OF
CATEGORICAL TESTS AND ADVANTAGES
OF AD HOC BALANCING
Palazollo v. Rhode Island,217 the Supreme Court's most recent reg-
ulatory takings case, is another symbolic opinion with strong rhetoric
about property rights but very limited substantive guidance. From a
managerial point of view, Palazzolo could be viewed as one step side-
ways as it clarifies a point raised in part by Lucas itself, one step back-
wards because it introduces new uncertainty into the Penn Central
balancing test, and not much else because it leaves other major issues
unresolved.
212. See Van Zelst v. Comm'r, 100 F.3d 1259 (7th Cir. 1996); McMurray v. Comm'r,
985 F.2d 36, 41-42 (1st Cir. 1993).
213. See CONSARC Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d 695, 701 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
214. See Carson Harbor Vill. Ltd. v. City of Carson, 37 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1994), over-
ruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th
Cir. 1997).
215. See United States v. 30.54 Acres of Land, 90 F.3d 790 (3d Cir. 1996).
216. See Stern v. Halligan, 158 F.3d 729 (3d Cir. 1998).
217. 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
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A. Facts and Procedural History
Anthony Palazzolo acquired title to property in Westerly, a coastal
town in Rhode Island, in 1978.218 The parcel consisted of a large wet-
lands area as well as some higher land. Palazzolo was denied a re-
quest to fill all the wetlands as well as a subsequent request to fill
some of the wetlands. After the second denial, Palazzolo filed an in-
verse condemnation claim in state court, alleging that a total taking
had occurred because "the Council's action deprived him of 'all eco-
nomically beneficial use' of his property."2 19 He sought "damages in
the amount of $3,150,000, a figure derived from an appraiser's esti-
mate as to the value of a 74-lot residential subdivision.22o The trial
court ruled against Palazzolo. 2 21
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed on three grounds.2 2 2
First, the court held that the claim was not ripe because Palazzolo had
never applied for a 74-lot subdivision or for any scheme that did not
involve substantial filling.223 Second, Palazzolo had not suffered a to-
tal taking under Lucas because the upland portion of the land had a
value of $200,000 if developed.2 24 Moreover, even if he had suffered a
total taking, he did not acquire title until after "the regulations limit-
ing his ability to fill the wetlands were already in place."2 25 Conse-
quently, the right to fill was not part of his title to begin with. Third,
Palazzollo did not suffer a taking under the Penn Central balancing
test because, at the time of the acquisition of the property, "there were
already regulations in place limiting Palazzolo's ability to fill the wet-
lands for development."2 26 Therefore, he had no investment-backed
expectation of a right to fill. This lack was "dispositive in this case"
and thus negated the need to "consider the other factors of the Penn
Central test."2 27
B. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and re-
manded the case for further proceedings. The majority held that the
matter was ripe for review for three reasons. First, there was no
doubt that Palazzolo would be denied a right to fill any wetlands, re-
218. The chain of ownership is complicated, but the Supreme Court concluded that
Palazzolo did not acquire title until 1978. See id. at 2456.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 2456-57.
222. Palazzolo v. State ex rel Tavares, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).
223. See id. at 714.
224. See id. at 715.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 717.
227. Id.
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gardless of how grandiose or minimal his scheme might be.228 Second,
possible dispute as to the value of any wetlands development that
would be permitted in light of other, unchallenged restrictions did not
prevent the matter from being ripe as a takings issue.22 9 Any dispute
about the value of this development related to the determination of
the fair market value of the wetlands, not to whether there was a final
decision by the Council.23 0 Third, the value of the uplands develop-
ment was sufficiently settled for review because both Palazzolo and
the state had accepted $200,000 as the value for upland
development.231
As to the possible development of the upland portion of the parcel,
Palazzolo did not challenge the finding that the upland parcel had a
developmental value of $200,000. Instead, he argued that his situa-
tion satisfied Lucas because it was such a substantial loss that he was
left with only "a few crumbs of value."232 This argument was rejected
on the ground that a regulation permitting a landowner to build a sub-
stantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the property "ec-
onomically idle."233 His argument that "the upland parcel is distinct
from the wetlands portion234 was also rejected because the issue was
not presented in the petition for certiorari. 23 5 However, the Court
noted:
This contention asks us to examine the difficult, persisting question of what is
the proper denominator in the takings fraction. Some of our cases indicate
that the extent of deprivation effected by a regulatory action is measured
against the value of the parcel as a whole; but we have at times expressed
discomfort with the logic of this rule, a sentiment echoed by some
commentators.
2 3 6
The Supreme Court rejected the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
adoption of the chronological approach 2 37 to determine whether filling
the wetlands was ever a part of Palazzolo's title and held that a tak-
ings "claim is not barred by the mere fact that title was acquired after
the effective date of the state-imposed restriction."238 Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion for the majority characterized the chronological rule as
228. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2458-60. Justice Stevens joined the five member ma-
jority on this issue. See id. at 2468-72 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
229. See id. at 2461-62.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 2460-61, 2464. This treatment of the record in terms of the state's
position was criticized. See id. at 2472-77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 2464.
233. Id. at 2465.
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. Id. (citations omitted).
237. For a discussion of this test and the similar "notice" test, see supra notes 172-93
and accompanying text.
238. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464.
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a rule that "[a] purchaser or a successive title holder like petitioner is
deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted restriction and is barred
from claiming that it effects a taking."2 39 This rule could not be ac-
cepted because it would mean that "the postenactment transfer of title
would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restrict-
ing land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable" and would thus
allow the state "to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause."240
Given rules concerning ripeness in regulatory takings, the owner of
the land at the time of enactment might have no claim. "It would be
illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim because of the
post-enactment transfer of ownership where the steps necessary to
make the claim ripe were not taken, or could not have been taken, by a
previous owner."2 41 In addition to policy and logic, the Court also
noted that Nollan v. California Coastal Commission242 had rejected
the sweeping effect of the chronological approach. 24 3
Because of their adoption of the chronological approach to posten-
actment acquisition, the Rhode Island courts did not apply the Penn
Central balancing test to Palazzolo's situation.244 Therefore, the Su-
preme Court remanded the case to the Rhode Island Supreme Court
so that the balancing test could be applied to the partial deprivation of
economic use suffered by Palazzolo.
The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy provides no guidance on
the application of the balancing test on remand. The opinion only
states that a takings "claim is not barred by the mere fact that title
was acquired after the effective date of the state-imposed restric-
tion."245 Justice Kennedy does not indicate whether the chronology of
acquisition vis-A-vis enactment is relevant to determining if a taking
has occurred. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion addresses this issue
and asserts:
ITihe fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title (other
than a restriction forming part of the "background principles of the State's law
of property and nuisance")... should have no bearing upon the determination
of whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking. The "in-
vestment-backed expectations" that the law will take into account do not in-
clude the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so
much of its value as to be unconstitutional. Which is to say that a Penn Cen-
tral taking ... no less than a total taking, is not absolved by the transfer of
title.
2 4 6
239. Id. at 2462.
240. Id. at 2462-63.
241. Id. at 2463.
242. 483 U.S. 825.
243. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2463-64.
244. See Palazzolo v. State ex rel Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000).
245. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464 (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 2468 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia's argument is rejected by five members of the
Court.2 4 7 Justices O'Connor and Breyer argue that the relationship
between the time of the acquisition and the adoption of the regulation
is relevant to the determination of the owner's reasonable investment-
backed expectations under the Penn Central balancing test.24 s Jus-
tice Stevens argues that a party who acquires property after enact-
ment is "simply the wrong party" to bring the takings claim.24 9
Justice Ginsburg, in an opinion joined by Justices Breyer and Souter,
dissents on the issue of ripeness but notes: "If Palazzolo's claim were
ripe and the merits properly presented, I would, at a minimum, agree
with Justice O'Connor, Justice Stevens, and Justice Breyer, that
transfer of title can impair a takings claim."2 50 Given this agreement
of five justices, it is reasonable to conclude that whether an owner ac-
quired property after the enactment of a restriction would be relevant
under the Penn Central balancing test. It would also be logical to as-
sume that "notice" of the likely adoption of a restrictive regulation
would be relevant to the application of the Penn Central test in cases
where the owner acquired title before enactment of the regulation.251
C. Impact
Palazzolo states one clear rule: Whether the use at issue was a
part of the owner's title to begin with will not be addressed simply by
determining whether the regulation at issue was adopted before the
owner acquired title.2 52 Thus, the per se rejection of a takings claim
247. See generally Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and
Thomas are silent on the issue.).
248. See id. at 2465-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (expanding on a portion of the ma-
jority opinion addressing chronology and arguing that "[courts properly consider
the effect of existing regulations under the rubric of investment-backed expecta-
tions in determining whether a compensable taking has occurred"); id. at 2477-78
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the chronology of acquisition vis-h-vis regu-
lation is relevant).
249. Id. at 2468-72 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. Id. at 2477 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (page references deleted).
251. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law,
27 URB. LAw. 215, 227-37 (1995). The effect of notice in a Penn Central balancing
test would be different from the per se effect of notice of more restrictive regula-
tions discussed in notes 173-178 and accompanying text. Palazzolo clearly rejects
such a per se approach. See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
252. The holding on ripeness was so fact specific that it did not establish a rule for
future cases. See, e.g., Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2459 ("Council's decisions make
plain that the agency interpreted its regulations to bar petitioner from engaging
in any filling or development activity on the wetlands .... ."), 2460 (holding that
the state's assertion that the value of developable uplands is in doubt "comes too
late in the day for purposes of litigation before this court"), 2462 ("Where the
state agency charged with enforcing a challenged land use regulation entertains
an application from an owner and its denial of the application makes clear the
extent of development permitted, and neither the agency nor a reviewing state
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under the second and third approaches that have been used by the
lower courts are not valid.25 3 In this regard, Palazzolo fulfills a useful
managerial function. However, the case provides a clear substantive
rule only in a negative sense-it clarifies a problem raised by Lucas2 54
by clearly stating what is not the test of limits inherent in the title.
Palazzolo provides no guidance on how to use the first approach,
which relies solely on "background principles,"2 5 5 in addressing this
issue. Instead, as to the issue of background principles, the Court
states: "We have no occasion to consider the precise circumstances
when a legislative enactment can be deemed a background principle of
state law or whether those circumstances are present here."2 56 Thus,
Palazzolo does not address whether Justice Kennedy's view or Justice
Scalia's view in Lucas will prevail as to legislation versus common
law.2 57 Nor does it address how to handle other historical arguments
about background rights.25s Moreover, Palazzolo arguably makes
takings analysis less clear because of the disagreement among the
judges concerning the role of postenactment acquisition in applying
the Penn Central test and by its gratuitous expression of "discomfort"
with the "parcel as a whole" approach to the denominator issue.
Palazzolo makes it clear that Lucas only applies where a total loss
of use is involved. More specifically, Palazzolo holds that a very sub-
stantial loss in value will not be treated as a per se taking on the basis
of the total takings categorical rule. The loss to Palazzolo was sub-
stantial because, if one accepts his assertion of the value of develop-
ment ($3,150,000),259 he would suffer a loss of 94% of the land's value
if left with a value of only $200,000.260 However, this is a rule only in
a negative sense because it simply indicates that Lucas had not im-
plicitly overruled prior decisions of the Court holding that very sub-
stantial losses in value were not takings. 2 6 1
Given the limited managerial guidance in Palazzolo, it is better to
view the opinion in symbolic terms. This characterization is also sup-
ported by Palazzolo's adoption of the Penn Central balancing test as
court has cited non-compliance with reasonable state law exhaustion or pre-per-
mit processes ... federal ripeness rules do not require the submission of further
and futile applications with other agencies.").
253. For a discussion of these tests, see supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 179-93 and accompanying text.
255. For a discussion of this test, see supra note 172 and accompanying text.
256. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464 (emphasis added).
257. For a discussion of these views, see supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
258. The state argued before the Supreme Court that Palazzolo's proposed use was
barred by Rhode Island's background principles, including "[e]nactments dating
to 1876" and understandings dating "from its earliest settlement." See Brief for
Respondent at 11-12, Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. 2448.
259. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2456.
260. See id. at 2460, 2464.
261. See supra note 3.
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the appropriate standard to be used on remand. Indeed, the primary
impact of the case is likely to be a revival of the symbolic approach of
Penn Central.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lucas has had very little effect as a limit on judicial decisions ad-
dressing regulatory takings. In this respect, Justice Blackmun's dis-
senting opinion was prescient; the majority had launched "a missile to
kill a mouse."262 A review of the cases indicates how exceedingly rare
it is for the courts to find this mouse. By itself, this rarity does not
necessarily mean that the Lucas total taking test is not useful from a
managerial perspective. It could be very useful if, in fact, it provided a
clear test for at least some takings disputes. However, the Lucas ap-
proach is too vague to achieve this result. This vagueness was one
reason why Justice Blackmun's concern was not to "save the targeted
mouse, but... to limit the collateral damage."26 3
Given the strong rhetoric concerning property rights in Lucas, it is
ironic that, to the extent that there has been collateral damage, own-
ers may have been the casualties. On the one hand, that rhetoric may
have intimidated regulators and caused them to be less restrictive of
development. However, it is plausible to assume that the regulators
have been watching the lower courts to see whether the rhetoric in
Lucas was having an impact on decisions. To the extent that they
have been watching, regulators have been learning that they need not
be intimidated, because owners were receiving very little benefit in
the courts from Lucas. Very few cases find that a total taking oc-
curred. Moreover, Lucas hurt owners in cases like Palazzolo, which
adopted an expanded version of the Lucas "exception" for pre-existing
limits. In many lower court opinions, this version served a manage-
rial function by becoming a per se rule of no taking, including cases
involving permanent physical invasions by the government, so long as
the owner had "notice" of the restriction.26 4 As a result, the rule was
clear under this expanded version: Owners with notice could not pre-
vail. Thus, the Lucas concern for certainty was served, but in a man-
ner that was contrary to the protection of owners' rights.
One important effect of the experience with Lucas has been to rein-
force the importance and role of Penn Central as the basic test for all
262. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1036 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
263. Id. at 1036-37 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
264. See, e.g., Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312, 315-16 (1997) (holding that
because the obligation to provide lateral for public highways was in force when
the owners acquired the property, the city's enforcement of the obligation did not
constitute a taking). For a discussion of the "notice" approach, see supra notes
173-178 and accompanying text.
513
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
regulatory takings cases. In effect, situations involving a total loss of
value or involving a physical invasion are special applications of the
Penn Central balancing test. In these two situations, the balance al-
ways tips in favor of the owner's pre-existing rights. Indeed, Penn
Central stated that if a land use "restriction makes property wholly
useless 'the rights of property... prevail over the other public inter-
est' and compensation is required."26 5 Similarly, where there is no
governmental purpose served by the restriction, the balance would al-
ways be in favor of the owner.2 66 One reason for the continuing im-
portance of Penn Central is its pragmatic rejection of per se rules in
favor of a balancing process. Only such a flexible approach can ad-
dress the complexity of takings decisions. There are problems with
this approach, and the disagreement in Palazzolo concerning the role
of post-enactment acquisitions in assessing investment-backed expec-
tations illustrates these problems. However, the continued vitality of
Penn Central, as evidenced by the remand for application of the test in
Palazzolo, indicates the value of its approach despite these problems.
Lucas's per se categorical rules did not solve the problems inherent
in the Penn Central approach. Per se rules can only work if the rele-
vant facts can be easily categorized, but such categorization is almost
never possible with takings cases. Moreover, Lucas is not simply an-
other failed attempt to simplify takings law; the majority in Lucas
knew that they were not really simplifying takings law. They were
aware that total takings would be rare and that they were not provid-
ing a test for identifying total takings or for determining an owner's
developmental rights.
Given this awareness, the Lucas opinion is more symbolic than
managerial. The categories are too vague and limited to be meaning-
ful tests. Instead, the categories serve as symbols that endorse prop-
erty rights by apparently placing clear limits on regulation while
simultaneously supporting regulation by using vague concepts that, at
best, apply only to very limited circumstances. The categories are also
symbolic in the sense that their apparent clarity affirms the "rule of
law" by appearing to provide explicit rules that will prevent ad hoc,
subjective decision-making by courts.
265. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128 (1978) (quoting Hud-
son Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908)).
266. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (enjoining the applica-
tion of the zoning scheme to plaintiff because inclusion of his property in the
district served no public purpose). Cf., e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994) (requiring a relationship between the impact of development and the pur-
pose served by dedication of the land to public use); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (same requirement as Dolan). But see, e.g., John D.
Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate Governmental
Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking, 29 ENmrL. L. 853 (1999) (arguing that lack
of purpose is not a test for takings).
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Penn Central is also symbolic, but its pragmatic balancing ap-
proach to takings is better than the formalistic approach of Lucas for
two reasons.2 6 7 First, Penn Central's balancing test is based on a can-
did admission that there is no standard. Instead, the best that can be
achieved is to use a fair process that tries to fit evolving contradictory
views about property rights to the circumstances of a regulatory limit.
In contrast, Lucas uses formal categories that are hard to apply in the
real world and explicitly introduces a troublesome new "natural
rights" approach into takings jurisprudence. Under this approach, an
owner has a natural right to at least some developmental use of land
unless the government can show that all developmental use is re-
stricted by the state's "background principles of law," which are "objec-
tively" defined by shared cultural expectations, not by "recent"
enactments. This culturally defined natural right has a disquieting
similarity to substantive due process because, given the open-textured
nature of cultural expectations, it provides virtually no limit on the
court's ability to frustrate majoritarian decisions where a "total tak-
ing" exists. Moreover, this natural law approach is less useful in guid-
ing decision-making than Penn Central's concept of reasonable
investment-backed expectations. Both are vague; however, expecta-
tions analysis has the advantage that it focuses on current concerns
and values rather than on sterile scholastic debates about the mean-
ing of a concept in Blackstone's Commentaries. 2 68
Lucas and Penn Central also differ considerably in terms of tone.
Penn Central is more neutral and demonizes neither regulators nor
property owners. Instead, it respects both and thus provides a frame-
work for the judicial process to balance the conflicting values at issue.
In contrast, Lucas fits into a pattern of decisions that adopt a style
that can be viewed as "bashing" of state courts and state legisla-
tures.269 For example, Justice Scalia's majority opinion adopts the
view that government has a natural tendency to use the police power
to eliminate private property2 70 and engage in "plundering"271 and
that the harm principles would not be an effective limit unless the
legislature had a "stupid staff."272
267. For a collection of articles arguing for and against formal categorical rules in
takings jurisprudence, see Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1581, 1849 (1988).
268. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212 n.5 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that "the Supreme Court of Oregon
appears to have misread Blackstone").
269. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
270. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922)).
271. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 n.14.
272. Id. at 1025 n.12.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Such views are clearly inappropriate for two reasons. First, they
are vastly out of proportion to regulatory conduct in the United States,
most of which is clearly proper. Lucas unleashes this rhetorical attack
in the context of a total taking, even though such a taking would
clearly be rare and was questionable under the facts in Lucas. The
sample of cases citing Lucas indicates just how rare total regulatory
takings are: None of the three total taking cases in the sample studied
involved land use regulation like zoning or environmental restrictions.
Thus, as a factual matter, there is little, if any, basis for Lucas's one-
sided view of the regulatory process. Second, the Penn Central balanc-
ing approach will be used in the vast majority of takings cases, and
the legitimacy of this approach relies largely on the concept that the
particularized fact-specific balancing is done in a procedurally fair
manner.273 "Bashing" state courts, legislatures, and regulatory agen-
cies undermines the legitimacy of the Penn Central process.
There may be many reasons for this unwarranted negative tone,
including the almost inevitable hubris of any court that is not subject
to review by a higher tribunal. However, an important reason for the
attacks may be the formalistic categorical approach underlying Lucas.
If there are clear "objective, value free" standards for identifying
rights, then only "bad" or "incompetent" legislators, administrators,
and judges will deny rights. In addition, the widespread advocacy of
balancing tests suggests to formalists that there is a widespread fail-
ure to appreciate not only the nature and value of property rights but
also the threat that regulators, unrestrained by the rule of law, pose
for these rights. As a result, strong language is viewed as necessary.
Palazzolo provides reason to hope that the court will reject the for-
malistic rhetorical approach of Lucas in favor of the more balanced
pragmatic realism of Penn Central. The ad hoc balancing test has its
own problems because it results in considerable uncertainty and in
reliance on courts and officials to apply the process of balancing cor-
rectly. Moreover, the Court could obviously provide more guidance in
structuring this process. Palazzolo is disappointing in this regard be-
cause it provides no clear additional guidance on how the balancing is
to be addressed in terms of defining investment-backed expectations
and in addressing the denominator problems. The gratuitous remark
about "discomfort with the logic of... [the parcel as a whole] rule274
is so delphic and portentous that it could hinder analysis of this type
of denominator problem. The lower courts have adopted a more posi-
273. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
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rive and useful approach to this problem because they have identified
factors relevant to structuring the search for fair solutions.2 75
Despite the problems with balancing, the Penn Central approach
provides a pragmatic process for an open, public resolution of the con-
flict between rights and regulations within a specific factual context.
A similar approach will be necessary to resolve the issues raised by
the Court's grant of certiorari to review whether a taking resulted
from the moratorium on development in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.276 There is merit to
both sides concerning temporary moratoria. On the one hand, as indi-
cated in the dissent to the petition for rehearing en banc by the Ninth
Circuit, lengthy or repeated temporary moratoria can have substan-
tially the same effect as more permanent prohibitions. 2 77 On the other
hand, temporary moratoria serve a useful purpose because, by main-
taining the status quo, they provide time for reflection and procedural
fairness in the planning process. This time is particularly helpful in
land regulation because, partly as a result of the tension between the
values of planning and free market development, planning depart-
ments are established but understaffed and politicians tend to post-
pone hard decisions concerning land use planning in order to seek
compromises and consensus. Thus, as with any regulatory takings is-
sue, moratoria require balancing by the courts in order to resolve diffi-
cult line drawing issues. A symbolic scheme that recognizes the
competing values and structures the balancing in a particular factual
context is the best approach for this task. Because of the problems of
vagueness and uncertainty that are inherent in this approach, it
would be better if we could find clear objective, value free categorical
rules about temporary moratoria. However, experience has shown
that there are no such formal rules to address problems like regula-
tory takings, at least no such rules that are not subject to reasonable
debate in the important hard cases.
2 78
This formalistic categorical approach should be avoided. In a
postmodern world where there are no "objective" truths, anyone
searching for such objective rules is like the crew searching for the
Snark in Lewis Carroll's The Hunting of the Snark.2 79 Carroll never
tells us what a Snark is; he simply lists the five very vague but "un-
mistakable marks by which you may know... the warranted genuine
275. For a discussion of the multifactor balancing test to be used in determining
whether subdivided parcels will be treated as a whole, see supra notes 141-43
and accompanying text.
276. 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000). This case is discussed above in notes 153-64 and
accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
278. See Hubbard, supra note 128, at 1142-45.
279. CARRoLL, supra note **.
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snarks."28° He also indicates that the captain of the ship used a map
that was "a perfect and absolute blank"281 and that the captain had
"only one notion for crossing the ocean, And that was to tingle his
bell."2 82 However, searching for Snarks or objective values without a
map or guide is only part of the problem. Actually finding a Snark can
be worse because of an extremely unsettling fact:
[A]lthough common Snarks do no manner of harm
... Some are Boojums .... 283
If your Snark be a Boojum ....
You will softly and suddenly vanish away
And never be met with again.
2 84
Eventually, one member of the crew finds a Snark. However,
He had softly and suddenly vanished away -
For the Snark was a Boojum, you see.
2 8 5
280. Id. at 21-22.
281. Id. at 16.
282. Id. at 18.
283. Id. at 24.
284. Id. at 30.
285. Id. at 83.
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APPENDIX 1 - REVIEW SHEET FOR SAMPLE OF CASES
CITING LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
Case Number: / Review date / /01
I. Parties
A. Affected party
1. Nature
a. individual person[s]
b. business[es] (includes associations)
c. could not tell
2. Size
a. small
b. large (e.g., likely to involve more than 20 residential
lots in size or more than twenty employees)
c. could not tell
B. Governmental unit
1. Federal
2. State
3. Local/regional
C. Other:
H. Court
A. Federal
1. Court
a. Traditional (Claims against state or local government)
(1) Court of Appeals (Circuits 1-11, D.C. Circuit)
(2) District Court
b. Claims against federal government
(1) Claims Court
(2) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
c. S. Ct.
d. Other:
2. Lucas or other challenge to property regulation at is-
sue? (Compare IV below)
a. Not at issue
b. If at issue, did court address merits?
(1) Yes, addressed merits
(2) No, avoided merits. If so, basis
(a) ripeness (exhaustion) (Same as V-B-3 below)
(b) abstention
(c) other:
B. State
III. Program
A. Environment
1. Wetlands/flood plain
2. Coastal
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
3. Species (animal, plant) protection
4. Other
B. Zoning
C. Forfeiture/nuisance abatement
D. Other:
E. Not a taking case
IV. Lucas total taking addressed?
A. If so, code "yes" and address the following:
1. Was there a total taking?
a. Yes
b. No. If so, was it because:
(1) not total (compare B-3 below)
(2) not property to begin with (or "notice")
(3) other:
2. How long did it take to identify (Measured by last appli-
cation date to date of decision)? [Note that decision not
necessarily final; see V below. Note also that appellate
decisions (e.g., F.3d) take longer than trial court (e.g., F.
Supp 2d).]
a. not possible to tell
b. two years or less
c. three years
d. four years
e. more than four years
B. If not addressed, code "no" and address the following con-
cerning the role of Lucas in the case:
1. Merely cited as a general proposition
2. Cited and used for a categorical Loretta taking
3. Lucas at issue but held not ripe (or not yet possible to
tell if total or if not "property to begin with")
4. Other:
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